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U.S. MARINE CORPS. 1ST. DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION.

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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE 1942		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Report on Guadalcanal Operation Volume 2				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Marine Corps 1st Division				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES JFSC WWII Declassified Records.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 90	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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D767.351
U4-1J
Vol. II

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D767.351
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U. S. MARINE CORPS. FIRST MARINE DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATIONS. PHASE II.

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U.S. Marine Corps. 1st. Division

DIVISION COMMANDERS FINAL REPORT ON
GUADALCANAL OPERATIONS (v. 2)

Phase II
(From H hour to Evening 9 August)

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

The convoy reached the transport area at 0651 on the morning of 7 August. Zero hour, the time for the landing on Guadalcanal, was set at 0910 and H hour, the time for the northern attack (Tulagi) was set at 0600. Debarkation was begun immediately under cover of ship's gunfire and air attack of the supporting carrier groups. A favorable sea permitted the use of cargo net gang-ways simultaneously on both sides of all ships. There were ample boats available for the operation and previous arrangements relative to assignment and rendezvousing of boats and the establishment of the boat pool functioned admirably (Annex A). There was no noise or confusion attendant upon the operation and it proceeded with the smoothness and precision of a well rehearsed peace-time drill. All boat formations crossed lines of departure promptly and moved inshore toward assigned beaches with all boat groups in good order and under excellent control.

There was little opposition to the initial boat movements and only the Halavo boats, which embarked a protective force for the right flank of the northern attack, were fired on from Gavutu as they approached Florida. All boats reached their correct beaches and debarked troops promptly and without casualties. From the view point of the landing force the ship to shore movement, even though made under favorable conditions, is to be regarded as an unusually successful operation. It was a convincing demonstration of the fruits of long years of thought and planning and combined training by the Navy and Marine Corps in developing a practical working technique for the conduct of amphibious operations. It likewise reflected the benefits to be obtained from a period of rehearsals of the precise operation immediately prior to its execution.

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THE SEIZURE OF THE TULAGI AREA

The assault on the Tulagi area was under the immediate command of the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General W. H. Rupertus, whose command post was first on the USS Neville and later on Tulagi Island. Unlike Guadalcanal, the landings on the three main islands of the Group, Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo were met with the most determined resistance of which the enemy was capable. Each of the three islands was a fort in itself, honey-combed with tunnels and caves, and thick with machine guns.

The intelligence estimates of the enemy troops in this area were remarkably accurate. These were seasoned naval landing force troops with the usual conscript laborers. The latter, in contrast to their fellows on Guadalcanal, fought with the utmost tenacity and courage. The enemy forces on the two islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo are thought to have been the maintenance and protective forces for the seaplane establishment set up on Gavutu, and their defense could be called the high point of Japanese resistance in this phase of the operations.

The first landing in the area was made by a company of the Division Reserve, B Company, Second Marines (Captain E.J. Crane). Guided by Pilot Officer C.E. Spencer, RAAF, an Australian aviator well acquainted with the district, they landed at H minus 207 (0740) on the west side of Florida Island near Maleta on a promontory which commands Beach Blue at Tulagi. They met no opposition.

A H-hour, 0800, the first wave of the First Marine Raider Battalion, under command of Colonel Merritt A. Edson, USMC, landed on Beach Blue, on the southwest slope of the northern ridge of Tulagi. (For Map of Tulagi see Annex B). The terrain there is hilly and wooded and great difficulty was expected. The Japanese, however, had retired to their caves and dugouts, and the only casualty suffered in the landing was one man killed by a sniper. Two Companies, B (Major Lloyd Nickerson) and D (Major Justice Chambers) landed in the first wave on a five hundred yard front. Avoiding the trails along each side of the island, which are commanded by steep cliffs, the two companies pushed straight across the island from the beach. B Company secured the settlement at Sasapi, and then swung to the right. D Company turned to the right after crossing the ridge, and the two companies swept down the northeastern half of the island to the phase line "A". B Company echeloned to the left rear of D and with its left flank resting on the beach line. C Company (Major Kenneth Bailey) and A Company (Captain L.W. Walt) landed in the second wave. C Company secured the right flank of the beach head and A Company advanced down the central ridge on the right slope with C Company echeloned to its right rear. No opposition was met on this side of the ridge until the raiders came to the phase line. On the other side, Company B ran into opposition in the form of enemy outposts at Carpenter's Wharf. The commanding officer of D Company, Major Justice Chambers, was wounded by mortar fire, after crossing phase line "A", and his Executive Officer, Captain W. Sperling, took command.

As Combat Team No. 2 (less E Battery, 11th Marines) under Lieutenant Colonel H.E. Rosecrans, USMC, landed at Beach Blue at 0830, all units of the raiders advanced to the southeast. Company C, Raiders, advancing on the southwestern side of the island, met heavy opposition at Hill 208 where a concentration of machine guns held them up for an hour. This was finally reduced with small arms fire and hand grenades. A and C Companies then continued on

to the hill west of the cricket ground, where Major Bailey was wounded, command of his company passing to his executive officer, Captain Robert H. Thomas. Only one platoon of C Company was able to advance beyond this point, and it continued on down the beach to the southeastern tip of the island. D Company advanced roughly parallel to A Company on the opposite side of the ridge, and by nightfall this company was on the north side and ridge line of hill 281. Company B took up positions for the first night in the government wharf area, Company A on the hill west of the cricket ground, and Company C on Company A's right flank extending covering to the beach. E Company (Weapons) Raiders (Captain George Herring) was in support along this ridge.

Combat Team No. 2 had started to land at H-hour plus 30 minutes. Two companies, E (Captain Harry S. Connor) and F, (Captain Charles R. Baker), cleaned out the snipers on the west end of the island. Company G, (Captain Harold T.A. Richmond) followed the Raiders down the ridge to the Government house area where it reported to Colonel Edson. He committed it to action with the mission of cleaning out the ravine north of the cricket ground, where there was a gap between companies A & D (Raiders). Three attacks failed to clean out this ravine, but contact along the Marine line was gained and maintained. One Platoon, Company H, (Captain Charles A. Rigaud) was attached to E Company (Fifth) as Sasapi. The remainder of the company was at Beach Blue as part of the security element at that place.

The day's fighting grew intense only after troops had passed the phase line and was typical of all offensive fighting against Japanese in this area. The enemy was strongly entrenched in cleverly constructed dugouts and tunnels. These positions could only be eliminated by bold action with grenades, well placed explosives and submachine guns. The enemy employed the tricks for which he has become known, such as letting the points of units go through him and then firing on the main body. Snipers tied into trees, under houses, behind rocks, continually harassed the attacking forces, and the naval gun fire preparation and aerial bombardment had little effect on the well dug in small groups and individual snipers.

The principal enemy defense seemed to be concentrated in the ravine west of hill 281, and on the steep slopes of the hill itself. Captured maps confirmed the fact that the strong opposition met here was the island main center of resistance. It became apparent that this area would not be reduced during the first day and a defensive line was set up along the ridge north and west of the ravine.

That night the enemy sortied and counter-attacked, driving a wedge between C and A Companies of the Raiders and isolating C near the beach and hill west of the cricket ground. They con-

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centrated their attack then on Company A in an attempt to sweep up the ridge toward the residency. "A" Company halted this attack, killing 26 Japs within twenty yards of the Company defense line. That night the Marines had their first taste of the Jap at his best in a savage all night fight, with every means of deceiving an opponent employed against them. The enemy from the ravine succeeded in infiltrating almost to the command post in the residency, and from 0030 to 0530 five separate attacks were made on the residency. Japanese from the southeastern end of the island trying to advance northward along each side of the ridge were stopped by Companies A and C, Raiders, on the west side, and Company D on the east. No serious breaks were made in the Marine lines during the night, in spite of the numerous infiltrations and on the morning of the 8th the Marines resumed the advance. Companies E and F, of the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (Combat Team No. 2) who had mopped up the western end of the island, on the first day advanced southward. On the second day they were in line northeast of hill 281, F on the right, E on the left, and advanced over the top of the hill to the southwest side of the island. F Company now flanked the enemy positions on the south, giving the Marines mortar and machine gun positions on three sides of the main Japanese concentration. At about 1500 G Company, Fifth Marines, and the Raiders pushed through the ravine, blasting the Japanese out of their principal strongpoints, and physical occupation of the island was complete.

The numerous snipers on the island were hard to find, and the next day Marines combed the area around hill 281 three times, finding snipers each time. For several days there were still snipers in the area and enemy still lodged in the caves which honey-combed hill 281. The tenacity of the individual soldier was astonishing. Each Jap fought until he was killed, each machine gun crew to the last man, who almost invariably killed himself rather than surrender. There were, it is estimated, about five hundred Japanese on the island, and of this number only three surrendered. According to these, some forty Japanese attempted to escape by swimming to Florida Island. Some of these, as well as others from the other islands of the group evidently succeeded, for Raider Patrols on the large island later spotted about seventy.

Casualties for the First Raider Battalion during the fight numbered seven officers and eighty-three enlisted, of whom three officers and thirty-three enlisted were killed or died of wounds on the island. The rest were wounded and were evacuated.

The Japanese had withdrawn to their caves and dugouts during the preliminary aerial bombardment and ships gunfire, evidently believing it to be only a raid. Continued bombardment kept them from effecting an organized defense until late in the afternoon of seven August, and the defensive installations--two 3" guns and two 13mm guns on hill 281--were never fully manned.

GAVUTU-TANAMBOGO

The First Marine Parachute Battalion, (Major Robert H. Williams, USMC), Commanding, effected its landing on Gavutu at H plus 4 hours (1200) on 7 August, following a five minute ships gunfire preparation on that island by Fire Support Group Mike (footnote a) and a ten minute dive bombing and strafing attack on Gavutu and Tanambogo by SBD aircraft from the carrier support group. This fire appeared to be most effective, starting several fires, and knocking out a three inch gun on top of hill 148 on Gavutu.

The preparation did not, however, silence all small arms fire, and the thirteen landing boats met heavy opposition from this fire as they approached the beach, "I". (For Map of Gavutu-Tanambogo, see Annex C). These boats intended to land at the concrete sea-plane ramps, but because the heavy naval gunfire and bombing preparation had tumbled huge blocks of cement in the path of the leading waves, several of the boats were forced to land along the concrete dock to the right. The enemy allowed the personnel in the first few boats to get ashore and off the beach line, and then concentrated on the rest as they hit the beach. The first boat landed in the slip to the left and secured a small beach head in spite of the opposition.

The remainder landed along the beach from the south side of the slip to the concrete dock on the right of beach "I". Personnel of the boats which landed on the dock were met by extremely heavy fire sweeping the top of the pier, which was some six feet above the water. One out of every ten men in the boats that landed here became a casualty, most of this group being immediately pinned down by fire on the beach line, and held there until about 1400. The fire on this area came from the northern slope of hill 148, from trenches across the island to the westward, and a considerable volume of it from the south coast of Tanambogo, some five hundred yards away across the water.

By 1400 the left flank of the landing party had advanced inland and with mortar fire had relieved the pressure on the right flank. A CP and dressing station was set up in the Lever Brothers store at the head of the slip. Major Williams was hit at about this time and command of the battalion passed to Major C.A. Miller. Physical occupation of the island extended over almost all of it by this time, but operations against the Japs dug in on the slopes of hill 148 were hampered by sniper and machine gun fire from the adjacent island, Tanambogo. This had been combatted by fire from the paratroopers near the concrete dock, but shortly before 1400 Major Miller requested immediate assistance of bombers on Tanambogo. At about 1430 he also requested that reinforcements be sent to land on Tanambogo and that the parachute battalion would support that landing from the present position on Gavutu.

SBD's answered the call, and, cooperating with mortars

(a) Fire Support Group Mike (62.4); Rear Admiral Scott; USS SAN JUAN, CL54; USS MONSSEN, DD436; USS BUCHANAN, DD484.

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on Gavutu, bombed and strafed Tanambogo for about ten minutes. Immediately afterwards two United States Destroyers laid down a concentrated fire on Tanambogo from the south firing over Gavutu, and shortly after that one of them circled Tanambogo, shelling it all the time. Several large fires were started and not a tree was left standing on the island. Fire from it against Gavutu slackened considerably and the paratroops completed the physical occupation of the larger island, (Gavutu) raising the United States flag on Hill 148 at 1800.

The extent and location of the enemy dugouts remaining on the island was not yet realized, however, and nightfall saw an increase in accurate enemy sniping. In the evening B Company, First Battalion, Second Marines, (Captain E.J. Crane), having been withdrawn from Florida Island as a reinforcement for the Parachute Battalion, joined Major Miller's command on Gavutu, and with three Higgins boats attempted a landing at 1845 on the north coast of Tanambogo. Five minutes of naval gun fire preceded the attack, but it was met by heavy small arms fire and two of the landing craft were driven off before they hit the beach. The third attained the beach, landed a portion of its personnel, and was driven off. This attack undoubtedly failed due to the troops being silhouetted by a huge gasoline fire burning on the beach. Late that night two of this stranded party succeeded in making their way back to Gavutu.

After dark the enemy force on Gavutu was strengthened by individuals who swam over from Florida and Tanambogo. The greatest force of the enemy was holed up in a cave in the steep cliff on the south shore of the island under Hill 148. Many of these Japanese sortied that night and did considerable damage by sniping. At the same time, personnel landing on the beach to the west, where there were piers and houses, caused several casualties. Heavy rain made concealment easy for the enemy.

Upon the report from the Parachute Battalion to the Assistant Division Commander of the failure of Company "B", 1st Battalion, Second Marines, to secure Tanambogo, the Assistant Division Commander at 2200 requested the Division Commander to secure the release of an additional combat team to him in order to secure Tanambogo. At 0615, 8 August 1942, Combat Teams "B & "C" were released to the Assistant Division Commander. Combat Team "C" was directed to land at Gavutu and from there utilize the same boats to make the attack and capture Tanambogo. Combat Team "C" was the 3rd Battalion, Second Marines (Reinforced) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R.G. Hunt, USMC.

This Unit arrived at about 1130, 8 August, and companies I (Captain M.P. Hagan) and K (Captain H.A. Courtney) assisted the parachute battalion in mopping up operations. Marine activities on the northern slopes of Hill 148 were hampered by long range sniping and machine gun fire from enemy forces on Tanambogo, but

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that afternoon another, and successful, attack was made on Tanambogo.

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The assault on Tanambogo was preceded by air and surface bombardment, and at 1615 two tanks of the 3rd Platoon, C Company, 2nd Tank Battalion (Lieutenant R.J. Sweeney) landed on the southern part of beach J, one to cover the south side of the hill and the other the east slope. One tank in delivering effective fire into the Jap positions got ahead of its supporting troops. The Japanese rushed out of their dugouts and caves and stalled it by inserting a large iron bar into the track. In attempting to free this bar the tank backed into a stump of a coconut tree and became lodged thereon with the overhanging portion of rear of the tank. Thus preventing any forward or rearward movement of the tank. The Japanese threw molotov cocktails and other inflammables which killed the entire crew with the exception of one man who managed to escape from the turret. Lieutenant Sweeney was killed in this tank. The other tank executed its mission perfectly being well supported by the advancing infantry.

Company I, 3rd Battalion, Second Marines, (Captain W.G. Tinsley) followed the tanks ashore, landing at 1620. About half of his force worked up the southern slope of the hill while the balance worked around the east and north sides and along the shore. The fighting was close and savage and sniper fire from nearby Gaomi (Palm) Island harrassed the landing party until about 1700 when USS Gridley silenced the enemy on the islet.

At this time the First Platoon of Company K (Lieutenant J.J. Donahue), with a few marine paratroops, crossed the causeway and took up positions on the south side of Tanambogo. By 2100 the southeast two-thirds of Tanambogo had been secured.

Nightfall found both islands under control, although hidden snipers on Tanambogo sortied for a counterattack which caused casualties but was otherwise unsuccessful, and there remained only the routine mopping up of isolated snipers. The cave on the south side of Gavutu was reduced by an amphibian tractor. Snipers who had occupied a wrecked Jap seaplane located about three hundred yards off the southeast beach of the larger islet were silenced by mortar fire which ruined the wreck for future snipers. Physical occupation of both islands was completed on the 9th, and all serious Japanese concentrations destroyed.

Casualties among the First Parachute Battalion were at first estimated to be 50-60% during the first day and a report to that effect was made by the ADC at 0007 on the eighth. This was later found to be exaggerated, but parachute dead for the entire three days of fighting numbered 27, and wounded 50. Casualties among the Second Marines for the first three days of fighting numbered 56, of which most can be presumed to have occurred on Gavutu and Tanambogo. The sniper activity of the enemy was accurate and determined, causing losses among our personnel con-

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tinuously for the first three days of fighting.

There was no means of counting all of the enemy dead on the two islands, many of them having been buried when their caves were dynamited, but the most accurate estimate puts the enemy strength on the two islands at one thousand, of which about six hundred were labor troops. Fifteen labor troops and five regular naval landing force personnel were captured. At least two boat loads of regular naval landing force (presumably aviation personnel) escaped during the night 8-9 August 1942, to Florida Island, but the rest were all killed. The enemy had no mortars on the island and few grenades. Among their weapons were captured U.S. rifles, model 1903, with ammunition captured at Guam, and some British Lee Enfields.

It was estimated that on Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo there were in all some 1,500 Japanese. Five hundred of these were on Tulagi and the remainder were on the two smaller islands. The Tulagi force was entirely Naval, said to be part of the Third Special Landing Force (Marines), with Headquarters at Rabaul. On Gavutu and Tanambogo about four hundred of the thousand odd Orange forces were regular naval troops (Marines and naval aviation personnel), and the remainder were laborers. No accurate count could be made of bodies, for many were left in the caves, which had been blown in upon them by high explosive. Total Japanese casualties can be set with reasonable accuracy at 1,500 killed, less 23 captured, and 70 escaped to Florida.

Our casualties, killed and wounded in the operation, totaled 15 officers and 233 enlisted of whom 8 officers and 100 enlisted were killed, missing, or died of wounds. Outstanding materiel loss to our troops during the northern operation was the tank of the Third Platoon, C Company, 2nd Tank Battalion, which landed on Gavutu and was burned out by the enemy. For total list of captured materiel see Annex D.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Dive bombing and gunfire are not effective against the caves and gougouts use so extensively by the enemy on Gavutu and Tanambogo. Nor are they particularly effective on gun emplacements unless bombs or high explosive shells land directly on these emplacements as a lucky hit. These must be reduced by ground troops with high explosives and short fused hand grenades. Machine gun fire is frequently ineffective because the enemy does not always dig his tunnels straight, but makes concrete partitions at right angles with the entrance line. High explosives placed by hand were the most effective means of reducing these emplacements. And the use of flame throwers would appear to be a highly practical and effective method. Accurate divebombing with depth charges might be successful.

2. Japanese labor troops, although unarmed, must not be presumed to be useless for fighting purposes. Although those on Guadalcanal had little combative spirit, those on Gavutu and Tanambogo were quite the opposite.

OCCUPATION OF GUADALCANAL

Seizure of Beachhead

The attack on Guadalcanal was premised on an estimate of defensive strength which proved entirely erroneous. The hostile force was placed at about 5,000 including 2,100 labor troops, an anti-aircraft battalion of 625 a reinforced infantry regiment of 2100 and air and naval detachments totaling 185. It was believed likewise, that, while the major portion of this force was disposed in the vicinity of Lunga Point, there was also a considerable body in the vicinity of Taivu point to the east where construction of an additional airfield had been reported by natives. Consequently the decision had been reached to avoid both the Lunga Point and Taivu Point defenses by a landing midway between, in the vicinity of Koli Point. Beach Red, which lies about 6,000 yards east of Lunga Point was chosen as the point of landing. It consisted of a slight reentrant in the coast line about 1600 yards in length with its eastern boundary the Tenavatu Stream and its western boundary the mouth of the Ilu River. Landing conditions were believed favorable, and the river constituted an obstacle for the protection of the more exposed right flank in the event of a counter-attack early in the landing from the direction of Lunga Point.

In pursuance of the plan of operations (Annex E) the Fifth Marines reinforced (Less Second Battalion) landed on Beach Red at zero hour with two battalions abreast, 1st Battalion on the right. Both assault Battalions advanced inland occupying a shallow beachhead bounded by the Tenavatu Stream--east branch of the Ilu (which runs generally parallel to the beach and 600 yards inland therefrom)--main body of the Ilu which runs northward into the sea. This natural beachhead offered a strong position from which to cover the landing of successive elements.

Advance to Lunga (1st Day)

Combat Group B (First Marines Reinforced) landed on Beach Red in column behind the Fifth Marines and when its landing was completed, the advance in the direction of Lunga Point was begun. Fifth Marines Reinforced (less 2nd & 3rd Battalions) crossed the Ilu at its mouth and began the advance along the beach with its right flank resting on the water's edge. Its assigned objective was the line of the Tenaru River. On their left, the First Marines advanced with Battalions echeloned to the left rear on magnetic azimuth 260° with "Grassy Knoll" its assigned objective.

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In this connection, it should be remembered that no adequate maps or photographs were in the possession of the Division. "Grassy Knoll" had been designated the objective on the strength of its description by a former resident as a commanding terrain feature of unmistakable appearance which dominated the entire area of Lunga Point and the airfield. As such, it represented the key terrain feature of the area, but in actual practice, it proved to be too large and too removed in point of distance to be of controlling importance from the point of view of the relatively small forces engaged.

The rear of the advancing force and the landing beach were covered by 3rd Battalion, Fifth Marines, which remained in place along the Tenavatu stream facing south and east.

The advance was begun at about 1530 but progress was extremely slow. The Ilu was found to be a deep stream with high steep banks and entirely lacking in fords. The Fifth Marines were able to cross the river at the sand bar on the beach at a point opposite the mouth but in the First Marines zone, it was necessary to construct temporary bridges. The need for this had been foreseen and light bridging materials had been sent ashore in amphibian tractors with initial assault waves. In view of the height of the banks and width of the stream it was necessary to construct a two span bridge using an amphibian tractor as a ponton to support the mid-stream end of each truss.

In addition to the delay in crossing the Ilu, the dense jungle encountered on the opposite side constituted a further obstacle to rapid progress. Some units advanced with unnecessary and time consuming caution. Others pushed ahead aggressively and lost contact with their neighbors. There was a uniform and lamentable failure to use patrols to the front and flanks. These difficulties when added to the great inexperience of junior officers and the lack of adequate maps for command purposes, rendered control and communication difficult to maintain, consequently the advance was halted at dusk in order to reestablish contact and reorient the advance for the following day. Positions occupied during the night are shown in Annex F.

Movement of Supplies (1st Day)

Meanwhile the ship to shore operation maintained a continuous flow of personnel and supplies across Beach Red, interrupted only by a high altitude attack against the transport group by a strong force of enemy two engined bombers from Rabaul at 1230. Timely warning of the attack was received and all ships were underway with fighters on station when the bombers appeared. The attack was comparatively ineffective, our losses consisting only of damage to one destroyer while the hostile formation was broken up and driven off with considerable losses. The attack was successful however in causing a loss of three hours unloading time.

By mid-afternoon, all personnel except unloading details had come ashore and the movement was taking on the aspect of a logistical operation involving the landing of supplies and heavy equipment. Supplies were beginning to pile up at the beach line and delay was experienced in the unloading of boats. The shore party organization was functioning efficiently and all concerned were doing their utmost, but, as had so often been pointed out in peacetime maneuvers, the manpower available at the beach was physically inadequate to cope with the tremendous volume of incoming supply. In theory the conditions might have been alleviated by the assignment of combat troops to unloading operations, but at the time in question, the Division Commander was constrained of necessity to dispose all his forces tactically. In the situation as it then existed, he occupied the most dangerous of all positions for any commander of a naval or military force; i.e. being in close proximity to a large enemy force which possessed complete knowledge of his dispositions and movements, while he, the Division Commander, was unable to make contact with the enemy or to gain information as to the direction from which he might appear. Under such circumstances and in order to insure the security of the entire enterprise, it was incumbent upon him to employ all his forces toward seizure of the objective and protection of rear area installations against assault from the flank or rear. This was particularly true since 2d Marines (less one battalion) had not been released to the Division Commander.

Advance to Lunga (2nd Day)

The advance to the west was resumed by the First Marines and Fifth Marines (less 2nd and 3rd Battalions) on the morning of 8 August. In accordance with orders issued during the night the day's objective was to be the line of the Lunga River, which was to be occupied by the First Marines, the Fifth Marines then passing to reserve in an assembly area near the airfield. Again progress was slow. The thick jungle encountered in the First Marines zone retarded their rate of advance, but on the right the First Battalion Fifth Marines was moving through favorable terrain consisting of the flat coconut plantations bordering the sea. Their slow progress can be attributed only to an excess of caution manifested by a hesitant and time consuming advance.

By midday a few prisoners had been examined, and it was apparent that no large Japanese force was in the vicinity and that the only regularly organized garrison had fled to the west. In consequence and in view of the continued delay in reaching phase lines and objectives, the Fifth Marines were directed to contract their front, and move rapidly astride the road leading to Kukun in order to seize the village and enemy installations there before nightfall. This they did under the personal direction of their regimental commander.

The Lunga River was crossed at the main bridge and no

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opposition was encountered until the advance elements entered Kukum at 1500. Light rifle and light machine gun fire was received from the low knolls near the village but this resistance was quickly overcome, and the entire area occupied. Meanwhile First Marines had reached more favorable terrain in the plains west of the airfield and by 1600 was in possession of the airdrome, having encountered only one small enemy patrol. It was directed to occupy the line of the Lunga. Positions occupied during the night are shown in Annex F.

The extent to which the enemy had been able to develop their Lunga Point positions was remarkable in view of the short time of occupation. Since 4 July they had succeeded in constructing large semi-permanent camps, finger wharves, bridges, machine shops, two large radio stations, ice plants, two large and permanent electric power plants, an elaborate air compressor plant for torpedoes, and a nearly completed airdrome with hangars, blast pens, and a 3600 foot runway.

The actual defenses of Guadalcanal were centered in the Lunga Point area. They consisted of three anti-aircraft batteries and machine gun emplacements. It is believed that the military garrison, excluding labor troops, consisted of about two hundred Naval personnel (Naval Officers and bluejackets) and about four hundred naval landing force troops (Marines). The latter were well trained and equipped and the reason for their precipitous flight toward Kokumbona must remain an enigma. There was no evidence of an organized conduct of defense although the Tonaru and Lunga Rivers offered opportunities for a few troops to inflict heavy damage upon any force engaged in a crossing. Camp sites showed signs of having been abandoned in a state of utter confusion. Stores and equipment had been broken into and scattered indiscriminately. Arms, ammunition and personal equipment were found abandoned in quantity; no effort had been made to execute even the most obvious and elementary of demolitions. Few dead were found as a result of the aerial and naval bombardment, but, upon examination of prisoners, it appeared that the daybreak bombardment caught the garrison completely by surprise and that a state of panic ensued which was followed by a precipitate and disorderly flight to the west.

Movement of Supplies (8-9 August)

Congestion of supplies became an acute problem during the night of August 7-8 and by 2300 it was necessary to ask that unloading operations be discontinued in order to reduce the dangerous accumulation of materiel along the water's edge. When unloading operations were resumed on the morning of 8 August, the right boundary of Red beach was shifted to the Block Four River, thus providing a new and unencumbered landing area more conveniently situated with respect to the direction of advance. The shift alleviated the situation to a limited extent, but the advantages gained were offset by the inevitable effect of fatigue upon personnel which

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caused the rate of handling supplies to decline steadily. Unloading operations were likewise interrupted by a heavy air attack at 1230 in which the USS George F Elliot was set on fire and lost with much of the supplies intended for CT5 (2nd Bn, First Marines, reinforced). During the night all transports got underway and proceeded to sea in order to avoid involvement in the night naval engagement off Savo. All ships returned on the morning of the ninth, but little was accomplished in the way of unloading. At sunset the transport force and escort cleared the area.

Events of 8-9 August

During the night 8-9 August the Division Commander left the command post, which was established near the beach in the vicinity of Alligator Creek, to attend a conference on board the flagship (USS McCawley). During the conference, Commander, Task Force 62 announced his decision to withdraw all naval forces from the area at 0600 on nine August (D plus 2 days), in order to avoid further ship losses from aerial attack. As the operation had been planned with the expectation that the transport force would remain in the area until D plus 4 days, and in view of the unsatisfactory progress of unloading supplies, the decision to withdraw the surface vessels was most alarming, as its execution would profoundly affect the entire future course of operations in the Solomons.

The Division Commander left the McCawley at about 2345 and proceeded on board USS Southard to Tulagi for the purpose of conferring with the Assistant Division Commander with respect to the amount of supply which had been put ashore in that area. This information was required because of the decision to withdraw the supporting naval forces. (Footnote B).

The situation confronting the division on the morning of nine August was as follows:

All objectives had been taken in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. Enemy forces in the Tulagi area were destroyed but those in the Guadalcanal area remained capable of reorganizing for effective local action against us. The terrain and the attenuated dispositions enforced upon us by the necessity of covering both our supply base at Red Beach and the Lunga Point installations afforded the enemy an excellent opportunity for raiding and harrassing tactics. The congestion of supplies at Red Beach was likewise a serious danger, as upon the departure of the surface vessels it would become the logical target for aerial attack, and, in addition, would be exposed to ship's gunfire bombardment by enemy surface vessels, which would be free to operate in the area by day or night. In addition there were reports of strong enemy landing forces with armored landing craft on transports at Rabaul which would be able to make an

Footnote B: Losses among allied surface vessels from enemy aerial attack up to 2300, 8 August: USS George F Elliot (Burned out), one destroyer damaged. -----
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attack on the area before nightfall, 11 August.

In consequence of the above, the following plan was decided upon:

To establish a strong water's edge defense at Lunga Point immediately.

To reduce the congestion of supplies at Red Beach by moving them to Lunga Point and by dispersing in place those which could not be moved immediately.

To employ the engineers in a rapid completion of the Lunga Point Airdrome.

To limit further operations against the enemy to active patrol operations pending establishment of Lunga Point defenses and the movement of supplies thereto.

On the morning of 9 August unit commanders were assembled at the Division command post where the situation was explained to them and orders issued for the establishment of defenses and the movement of supplies.

The transport group returned during the day but little or nothing was accomplished in the way of a further landing of supplies. At sunset all vessels cleared the area, proceeding eastward through sealark channel.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ship to Shore Movement:

1. The organization for landing, the technique of ship-to-shore movement, landing craft and special landing equipment developed in the ten years prior to the war were satisfactory to a degree beyond expectation.
2. The operation did not involve a real test of methods of controlling ships' gunfire by shore based fire control parties. However, nothing developed during the operation to indicate the need for any fundamental changes in doctrine.
3. Centralized control of supporting aircraft proved satisfactory in view of the relatively few missions required. The inference is permissible, however, that need for a more direct air-ground contact would have been felt had serious resistance been encountered on Guadalcanal. This was appreciated in advance but lack of time prevented organizing and training air control groups for liaison duty with lower units.
4. The landing reemphasized the vital nature of the logistical problem presented by the ship-to-shore movement of supplies. As had been foreseen, the Pioneer Battalion proved inadequate in size to cope with the tremendous burden placed upon it. Adequate supplementary labor must be provided. It is considered that there must be available to the shore party on the landing beach additional personnel in the proportion of 100 men for each vessel discharging cargo across the beach.
5. The use of liaison planes in the ship to shore movement was based on an unsound principle and would, had there been active resistance at the beach line, have deprived the division commander of air observation in the later stages of the landing when he needed it most. The practice objected to consisted of dropping smoke bombs to mark the extremities of the landing beaches. This required eight runs by the liaison planes at exceptionally low altitudes. It is considered that this use of the liaison planes is an unnecessary hazard as proper identification of a landing beach should be possible through map or photographic study.
6. Subject to the foregoing, shore-party organization and technique embodied in Atlantic Amphibious Force General Order No. 7-42 proved sound in operation.

Beachhead Line Operations:

1. A determined low level or dive bombing attack on the landing beach may prove ruinous unless supplies are promptly cleared to dispersed dump areas. Likewise great attention must be paid to the rapid establishment of a strong anti-aircraft defense of the landing beach.

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2. To the greatest extent possible ammunition should be loaded on vehicles and Amphibious Tractors prior to embarkation. This will permit a large proportion of the initial ammunition supply to be landed with maximum speed and minimum exposure.

3. A comparison of the several landings points to the inescapable conclusion that landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed and undetected at a point within striking distance of the objective.

Equipment:

1. Initial equipment was cut to the minimum for this operation with accompanying savings in shipping space and increases in mobility. This decision proved sound and will be followed in future operations.

2. Medically speaking, the weight of the equipment carried by the individual marine was excessive for jungle operations, especially in view of the fact that all hands had been held on transports without opportunity for conditioning exercises for many weeks. Although water supplied from ships contained one tenth of one percent of salt in solution, neither this nor the salt tablets carried by combat medical units was sufficient to replace the salt loss of the unconditioned troops.

3. While equipment employed in the landing proved generally satisfactory, the amphibian tractor demonstrated a usefulness exceeding all expectations. Some of the initial missions assigned were transporting bridging material from ship to erection site direct, ammunition carrier, prime mover for 105mm guns, bridge pontoons and ambulance. These missions were executed early in the operation under conditions of terrain which precluded the use of trucks. The amphibian thus made a vital contribution to the operation by its performance of diverse missions beyond the capacity of conventional vehicles. It proved proof against the fire of enemy .25 calibre weapons in one instance where a tractor was employed to attack a cave on Gavutu. It is to be observed that this was an emergency undertaking only as it is not considered that the tractor is a tactical combat vehicle.

4. The Reising gun proved definitely unreliable. Other arms and equipment were satisfactory for landing but too heavy for the jungle warfare to follow. It is recommended in particular that the light machine guns be made available as a reserve substitute for the heavy guns and that 60mm mortars be made available as a reserve substitute for the 81mm mortar. This will permit a desirable flexibility through a limited degree of selective armament to meet special operational conditions. In future operations this division will reduce the amounts of ammunition carried by the individual. Only one canteen per man was available; two were needed.

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5. The lack of adequate maps and photographs was to be a distinct handicap which continued throughout the entire period of our occupation of Guadalcanal. A recommended future procedure:

(a) Designation of an aerial photography unit to take photographs in accordance with exact landing force requirements.

(b) Direct liaison between landing force and designated photographic unit.

(c) Photography unit to supply negatives and six prints of every photograph taken and to furnish mosaics including copying camera negatives of all mosaics so provided.

(d) Landing force photolitho unit to reproduce photographs and mosaics in quantity for unit distribution.

Initial Supply:

1. For this operation 60 day's supply and 10 units of fire were embarked. While these amounts represented reductions of 33% of supplies and 50% of ammunition as compared to the normal levels of 90 days and 20 units they nevertheless proved somewhat excessive from the point of view of immediate requirements. Only a fraction of these supplies were actually landed; that this fraction proved inadequate in no way detracts from the conclusion that amounts actually embarked were somewhat excessive.

2. In view of the foregoing the following recommendations are submitted:

(a) That not to exceed thirty days supply, 10 units of fire, and 50 days rations be embarked.

(b) That only half this material be landed initially and that the transports clear the area on D plus 1 day.

(c) That APA's carrying the remainder of the supplies be withheld from the danger area initially and that, beginning on D plus 2 day, they be committed singly or in pairs at regular intervals to permit orderly unloading and to reduce the target offered to hostile aircraft.

Operations (General):

1. Considering the elementary state of training of the troops and the inexperience of junior officers, combat discipline of the division was satisfactory. There was little or no straggling and no serious offenses were noted. There was some minor pilfering of stores and a certain degree of carelessness with respect to individual equipment. Outposts and sentinels were tense and apprehensive at night; there were instances of random firing,

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and firing upon friendly parties. These represented the natural reactions of green troops in their first action, deficiencies which disappeared as confidence was acquired. A more serious deficiency was the failure to patrol actively and aggressively to front and flanks.

2. On Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo, the combat assumed the nature of a storming operations from the outset, a soldier's battle, unrelenting and relentless, to be decided only by the extermination of one or another of the adversaries engaged. Soldierly behavior was manifest wherever the enemy was encountered. Individual morale was excellent and there was an unflinching willingness to accept the risks and hazards of a close and sanguinary combat.

3. Cooperation of all services with respect to an area to be attacked should be attained in time to provide complete accurate maps and aerial photographs of the projected theatre. All units of a task force should use the same map. In the Guadalcanal landing, the maps used by the landing force were not only incomplete but in many cases inaccurate. The maps used by the escorting task force and support aircraft were not the same as those of the landing force, a situation which had the obvious result--orientation between the two units by coordinates was most unsatisfactory.

4. On Guadalcanal the advances of the two infantry regiments on the seventh and eighth was retarded to a dangerous degree by several contributing factors. Most of these, it must be realized, were directly attributable to the elementary state of training and the almost total lack of experience in jungle warfare except among senior officers and NCO's. Some units advanced too slowly, not only because of the difficult terrain, but also because of excessive caution on the part of subordinate leaders.

5. Casualties were relatively low in view of the nature of the resistance encountered. In large part this may be attributed to the excellent tactical direction of senior battalion officers.

6. Operations in general pointed to the fact that insufficient training had been conducted in close and difficult country approximating jungle terrain. Large sections of the divisional training area in New River were ideally suited for this purpose but were generally neglected in favor of open terrain.

7. Likewise insufficient emphasis had been placed on physical training to acquire the stamina necessary to march and fight. This condition was aggravated by the deteriorating effect on long periods aboard ship.

8. While the division as a whole was made up largely of green troops with inexperienced company officers it should be observed that battalion commanders and higher ranks consisted of thoroughly experienced and capable officers on whose shoulders rested the major burden of planning, organizing and directing the operation.

LIST OF ANNEXES FOR PHASE II

- A Instructions for Establishment of Boat Pool
- B Map of Tulagi
- C Map of Gavutu
- D ADC Report on Gavutu-Tanambogo-Tulagi
- E Operations Order 7-42
- F Map Annex Showing Positions on Guadalcanal First and Second Nights
- G Intelligence Annex
- H Medical Annex
- I Artillery Annex
- J Logistics
- K Aviation Annex
- L Fifth Marines Annex
- M First Marines Annex
- N Extracts from Operations Journal Annex
- O Communications Annex

NOTE: In many cases annexes are appended merely to present a fresh and more detailed point of view. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed therein do not necessarily bear the approval of this headquarters.

ANNEX A

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF BOAT POOL

MAILGRAM

DELIVER THIS MAILGRAM TO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IMMEDIATELY UPON
RECEIPT FOR DISTRIBUTION AND HANDLING AS A REGULAR DISPATCH.

:DATE: 30 JULY 42

FROM: Commander Task Force 62 :

:MAILED: At Sea.

TO : Commander Transport Group Xray.
Commander Transport Group Yoke.
Commanders Transport Divisions Afirm, Baker, Cast, Dog.
All Commanding Officers of Transports and Cargo vessels.
Commanding Officer of troops in all Transports and Cargo
vessels.

Special Instructions

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1. To insure against delayed arrival of the assault groups in full strength at the beach because of breakdown or absence of boats the following measures shall be taken:

(a) The PRESIDENT HAYES, as soon as boats are in the water, will provide, in addition to the 3 Tare boats and 3 Tare Roger boats required in Boat Group No. 1 in Annex Fox (revised) of 1st MarDiv Op Ord 7-42, 15 Tare boats and 2 Tare Roger boats to form a pool of STANDBY boats on a line between the FULLER and the AMERICAN LEGION. The PRESIDENT HAYES will place an experienced officer in command of this pool who will operate as directed by the BOAT FLOTILLA COMMANDER (Control Commander) for Transdiv Afirm. The boats of this pool are available for use in the event of insufficient boats in operating condition to debark the troops of Combat Group "A" and to provide 5 spare boats to follow the boats of the assault groups to the vicinity of the beach in order to transfer troops from any boats in the assault group that may breakdown or receive damage enroute. Where transfer of materiel is impracticable the broken down boat will be taken in tow. After Combat Group "A" has landed these boats will return to their ships and await orders from Commander Transport Group Xray.

(b) The PRESIDENT ADAMS, as soon as boats are in the water, will provide 14 Tare boats in addition to 4 Tare and 3 Tare Roger boats required in Annex Fox (revised) to 1st MarDiv Op Ord 7-42, to form a pool of STANDBY boats on a line between the BARNETT and McCAWLEY. The PRESIDENT ADAMS will place an experienced officer in command of this pool who will operate as

ANNEX A (Cont)

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directed by BOAT FLOTILLA COMMANDER (Control Commander) for Transdiv Baker. The boats of this pool are for use in the event of insufficient boats in operating condition to debark troops of Combat Group "B" and to provide 5 spare boats to follow boats of Combat Group "B" to the vicinity of the beach in order to transfer troops from any boats that may break down or receive damage enroute. When transfer of materiel is impracticable the broken down boat will be taken in tow. After Combat Group "B" has landed these boats will return to their ships and await orders from Commander Transport Group Xray.

(c) Commander Transport Group Yoke will organize boat pool in vicinity of NEVILLE by using initially the boats of the HEYWOOD from which spare boats may be provided, particularly in the case of Transdiv Twelve.

(d) Commanders of troops aboard all vessels in Transport Group Xray will confer with Commanding Officers of vessels in which they are embarked with a view to effecting debarkation of their units and still leaving at least 5 percent of total Tare and Tare Roger boats allocated by Annex Fox (revised) of 1st MarDiv Op Ord 7-42, as spares for use in the case of breakdown of boats previously allocated.


(e) Boat pools, set up in accordance with provisions of (a) and (b) above will not be utilized until it is definitely determined that boats provided under Annex Fox (revised) of 1st MarDiv Op Ord 7-42 are not repeat not in an operating condition.

(f) BETELGUESE lower all boats and await orders of Commander Transport Group Xray.


~~SECRET~~
Released by:

Hamilton Hains, LtComdr, USN
Flag Secretary

SPECIAL MAP - TULAGI
D-2, 15 JULY 1942
SHEET - 1:12,000



ANNEX C



ANNEX C

ANNEX D

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25 August, 1942.

From: ADC
To : The Commanding General
Subject: Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report Of Captured Material).
Reference: A. ComTaskFor 62, Serial 00050, Paragraph 13.
Enclosure: Blueprints of Radar equipment. (Probable)

I. TULAGI

A. Enemy Strength

1. It is estimated that on TULAGI there were approximately 450 to 500 Japanese troops. Prisoners have stated that these troops were a part of the 3rd Special Landing Force, commanded by Yano, with headquarters in RABAU.

2. On TULAGI, this force was commanded by a Lieutenant Keikichi Yoshimoto. Included in the group were some Corpsmen, Communication and Paymaster personnel.

3. Of the number estimated to be on the island, three were captured. Combat Team Two buried an estimated 110, the Raider Battalion buried an estimated 250, and an estimated 50 were buried in scattered graves about the island. An undetermined number were also buried in the caves. According to captured prisoners, approximately 40 Japanese attempted to escape by swimming to FLORIDA Island. Some of these very probably succeeded. Again the number is unknown, but at least four Japanese were captured on FLORIDA.

4. According to prisoners taken and questioned on TULAGI, there were no laborers on this Island.

B. Enemy Disposition

1. During the advance to Line A there was no organized enemy resistance encountered. Japanese outposts in this area were not contacted and remained in the rear of the advance, necessitating later mopping-up operations against snipers. The effect of snipers in rear of our advance was to tend toward con-

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

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fusion, especially at night. Actual casualties caused by them were not an appreciable number.

2. The Japanese apparently had withdrawn to caves and dugouts during the initial aerial bombardment, believing the attack to be merely a raid. Continued aerial and naval bombardment thereafter kept them under cover and prevented their effective organization of defense until late afternoon of D-Day.

3. Defensive installations, although never fully manned, were located on TULAGI as follows:

- (1) Two three inch guns on Hill 281.
- (2) Two 13 mm AA guns on Hill 281.
- (3) Several light machine guns covering the valley between the south-eastern slope of the Residency Hill and Hill 281.
- (4) A machine gun covering White Beach from the south-eastern slope of Hill 281.
- (5) Sandbag, reinforced dug-outs in the valley between Hill 281 and the south-eastern slope of Residency Hill covering the valley and White Beach.
- (6) Numerous caves combined with dug-outs with an unknown number of weapons provided interlocking fire for the defenders.

4. An enemy counter attack supported by machine gun fire was launched against our positions on the south-eastern slope of Residency Hill about 2230 by an estimated group of about 200 Japanese. A slight penetration of our lines was effected, but positions were regained in the early morning hours.

5. Mopping-up operations against snipers in the north-western half of the Island required two days, in the south-eastern half of the Island required four days.

6. Five inch guns, reported located in this area, have not been found.

7. A landing at White Beach would undoubtedly have encountered strong resistance. The landing at Blue Beach was never realized by the defenders due to lack of observation of that beach from the caves and dugouts to which they had retired.

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

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C. Captured Prisoners

1. Troops

- (1) TAKAHASHI, Kyoichi 1st Class Sailor
- (2) IWATA, Masakane 1st Class Sailor

2. Laborer

- (1) YAOITA, Takeo Meteorologist

3. Natives

- (1) BOGESE, George Native Medical Practitioner (suspected of being a Japanese sympathizer)
with wife and
three children

D. Captured Material

- 1 Motor-cycle #23527 (in need of repair)
- 1 1½-ton truck #50538 (not serviceable now)
- 1 1½-ton truck #45; motor #F117 (with broken search-light-truck is serviceable)
- 1 1½-ton truck #54 (not serviceable)
- 21 Rifles, 25 calibre
- 2 13 mm AA guns (serviceable and in use)
- 1 Three inch gun (serviceable and in use - one may be used for spare parts)
- 1 Fifty foot lighter, tank (serviceable)
- 4 Twenty foot boats, whale (serviceable)
- 1 Machine shop, small (virtually intact)
- 50 40 mm shells, cases (500 rounds)
- 44 Grenades, hand, cases (880 grenades)
- 11½ Grenades, rifle, cases (460 grenades)
- 130 Ammunition, 25 calibre, cases (187,200 rounds)
- 38 Ammunition, 303 calibre, cases (22,800 rounds)
- 1 Thrower, flame (unserviceable)
- 3 Machine guns, heavy) Taken to Guadalcanal by CT 2.
- 7 Machine guns, light)
- * 300 Kerosene, gallons
- * 500 Gasoline, 72 Octane, gallons

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

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1 Wharf - Government Wharf; Seventy feet long. 30 feet depth of planking with additional 60 feet dirt area. Pier is five feet above water at mean tide; 30 feet of water at end of pier, 55 feet of water ten feet outboard of pier at mean tide. The rise and fall of the tide is three feet. The pier is basically weak.

1 Marine Railway - at SESAPI

1 Marine Railway - at Carpenter's Wharf

* Most of this material has already been expended.

NOTE: There are numerous other wharfs around TULAGI but they are all weak and practically unserviceable as a result of constant banging on the part of tank-lighters.

1 Radio. Transmitting and receiving equipment, portable, operating on frequencies from 4,000 to 12,000 kilocycles (serviceable).

1 Ultra portable radio, transmitting and receiving equipment, operating on frequencies from 23 to 30 megacycles. (Not in operating condition). NOTE: Parts of this set added to another of its type and dispatched to Admiral McCain.

E. Captured Supplies

252 Rice, bags
44 Hard, tack, cases
11 Fish, halibut, cases
9 Fish, salmon, cases
6 Peas, cases
29 Fish, tuna, cases
4 Coco, cases
33 Miscellaneous foods, cases
100 Salt, pounds
200 Noodles, pounds

NOTE: The majority of the above supplies already expended.

II. MAKAMBO

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

[REDACTED]

- A. No enemy opposition was encountered on this Island.
- B. On MAKAMBO, the Burns and Phillip Wharf of reinforced concrete may be suitable for limited use, if so desired.
- C. One small railway on the Island (unserviceable).
- * D. Gasoline, 3,500 gallons (approximately), 72 Octane.
- E. No other material or supplies were found on MAKAMBO.

NOTE: * Already expended.

III. GAVUTU AND TANAMBOGO

A. Enemy strength

1. It is estimated that on GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO there were approximately 1,000 Japanese. Approximately 400 of this number are believed to have been troops. The remainder were apparently conscripted laborers.

2. It is believed that most of the troops on these Islands were Navy personnel operating the seaplanes which were based there. From reports of prisoners, a Captain in the Navy was commander of the air force group on the two Islands.

3. There were 50 sailors under a Special Lieutenant Senior Grade, Miwa by name, who manned anti-aircraft guns, according to prisoner reports.

4. Of the number estimated on these islands, 20 were captured. The Third Battalion, 2nd Marines, buried an estimated 655. An estimated 300 were buried in caves and remainder probably escaped to FLORIDA Island.

5. There was also a sizeable Communication outfit manning the Radio Station on GAVUTU, according to prisoners.

6. Captured uniforms had rank insignias on the sleeves and caps indicating naval forces.

ANNEX D (Cont)

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

B. Enemy Disposition

1. As on TULAGI, the Japanese withdrew to their caves which, however, commanded the beach area and allowed one wave of our troops to land and then opened fire on the beach area and the succeeding waves as they made the beach. The fire of succeeding waves was thus masked to a large extent by troops advancing from the beach.

2. Dive-bombing and gunfire was not effective against these cave installations. The fire from these caves was over-lapping and effective against our attacking troops.

3. It took many days to clean out snipers on these Islands. The snipers were particularly accurate at night.

4. Many Japs swam over from FLORIDA Island to attack our troops at night.

5. On several occasions, unarmed Japanese would attack superior Marine forces. In fact, many of them simultaneously attacked one of our tanks and, although they were practically all killed, they succeeded in stopping the tank and killing its crew.

C. Captured Prisoners

1. Troops

- (1) WATANABE, Saburo - believed to be an officer, although he claimed to be a carpenter.
- (2) HAYASHI, Yoshio - 1st Class Sailor
- (3) YOKOYAMA, Senka - 1st Class Sailor
- (4) TAKAMOTO, Yuko - 2nd Class Sailor
- (5) MATSUMOTO, Haruji - 3rd Class Sailor

2. Laborers

- (1) SATO, Yoshio - Conscripted (barber)
- (2) INAZUMI, Guntoshi - Conscripted (paymaster)
- (3) IIMATA, Takeshi - Mechanic
- (4) OBI, Takeshi - Truck driver
- (5) LAITO, Fuku - General laborer
- (6) OSUMI, Yoshio - Service laborer

 Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
 Material).

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- (7) TAJIMA, Chio - Laborer
- (8) TANAKA, Akira - Cook
- (9) MAEKAWA, Tsumeo - Utility worker
- (10) SATOZAKI, Tsumeo - Carpenter (foreman)
- (11) INADA, Seizo - Common laborer
- (12) TANAKA, Tomichi - Shipyard steelworker---
employee of Naval Const-
struction Corps.
- (13) SAKURAI, Masakatsu- Stone Cutter
- (14) GOZU, Mineo - Laborer
- (15) YAMAZAKI, Tetsuhiro Laborer

D. Captured Material

1. Radio Gear

- 1 High Frequency Receiver (probably RADAR),
range 18 to 107.5 megacycles
- 1 Communications receiver (poor condition),
250 to 2,000 kilocycles, high range;
20 to 1,500 kilocycles, low range.
- 1 RADAR Unit (believed)
 - 1 Receiver with tubes as listed:
 - 9 RE3 semi-acorn type
 - 1 955 acorn type
 - 1 954 acorn type
 - 1 6F7 employed as oscillator (mis-
sing)
 - 1 Indicator unit with 6" cathode ray
tubes
 - 1 Indicator unit with four 3" cathode
ray tubes
 - 1 KEYSER Unit
 - 2 Power units
 - 1 Power distribution unit
 - 1 Power unit
 - 1 Unit. (purpose unknown)
- 1 Volt Meter - 500 volts DC (good condition)
- 1 Megger (good condition)
- 8 28-cell wet batteries, 56 volts
- 100 Mixed types, dry-cell batteries
- 3 Assorted tubes, cases
- 3 Step-up transformers (one undamaged)
- 1 Control panel for power distribution
- 1 Blueprints, set (for either direction finder
or RADAR)

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

Transmitter Equipment

- 2 High-powered transmitters
- 2 Power units
- 5 Rectifier power units
- 5 Transmitters

NOTE: The above mentioned for high-power

- 2 Medium-powered transmitters

NOTE: Of the total transmitting gear, one set can be put into operation after extensive overhaul. The remainder may be used for spare parts.

2. Other Material

- 1 Jack (salvageable)
- 1 Wrench, pipe (salvageable)
- 1 Cutter, pipe (salvageable)
- 1 Hammer, sledge (salvageable)
- Miscellaneous small tools (some may be salvageable)
- 3 Engines, diesel, "Southern Cross" (may be salvageable)
- 1 10KVA Power Transformer, (apparently salvageable)
- 2 10KVA Power Transformers, (cases punctured)
- 1 Power Unit, auxiliary, (salvageable)
- 24 Oil, lubricating, 60 S.A.E., drums.
- 1 Tractor, Allis-Chalmers, (salvageable)
- 1 Unit, refrigerating (parts salvageable)
- 3 Landing dollies, seaplane (salvageable)
- 4 Oxygen, bottles, 220 cubic foot, (empty but salvageable)
- 1 1-ton chain hoist, (salvageable)
- 1 Angle iron, ton, (salvageable)
- 7 12-volt storage batteries, vertical beacon light, (salvageable)
- 1 Double-gearred, hand-operating winch, 3-ton capacity, (salvageable)
- 300 Nails, 4.6 and 8 penny, pounds, (salvageable)
- 1 Jack, 8-ton, moveable base screw, (salvageable)
- 24 Wedges, steel, (salvageable)
- 30 Picks, mattocks, shovels, (salvageable)

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including report of Captured
Material).

50 Screws, assorted, wood, pounds, (salvageable)
4 Batteries, storage, 52-volt, 10-amphere hours,
(Salvageable)
200 Nails, assorted boat and wire, pounds,
(salvageable)
4 Saws, 2-handed crosscut, (salvageable)
1 Mixer, concrete, hand-operated, 3 cubic feet,
(salvageable)
100 Line, 3/4", new, pounds
100 Line, 1/2", new, pounds
1 Pump, air, hand, foreign fittings, (salvageable)
200 Nuts and bolts, assorted, pounds, (salvageable)
2 Twine, one ply, bales, (salvageable)
3 Nails, roofing, kegs, (salvageable)
1 Hinges, assorted, box, (salvageable)
2 Springs, truck, sets, (salvageable for spares)
3 Tires and wheels, truck, (salvageable)
6 Brooms, stable, (salvageable)
1 Cooler, water, (condition undetermined)
1 Wire, copper, insulated, assorted sizes, ton
300 Wire, copperized, bare, pounds
1 Wire, iron, assorted sizes, ton
5 Globes, lantern, cases, (salvageable)
6 Handles, pick, axe and shovel, bags, (sal-
vageable)
6 Metal stock, brass, copper, iron, steel, in
varying thicknesses, tons, varying
shapes, (salvageable).
2 Nuts and bolts, assorted, tons, (salvageable)
30 Sheet, aluminum, 3' x 6', heavy guage,
(salvageable)
1 Fittings, pipe, large, ton, (salvageable)
1 Packing, box, gland and stuffing, box,
(salvageable)
100 Rope, grass, 1/2", pounds, (salvageable)
1 Regulator, welding torch, (salvageable)
1 Blower, forge, (salvageable)
2 Vises, large bench, (salvageable)
2 Mesh, concrete reinforcing, tons, (salvageable)
2 Iron and pipe, angle, assorted, tons,
(salvageable)
1 Spark plugs, radio-shielded, case, (salvageable)
1 Turntable and gear, large, (broken-up)
1 Compressor, two horse-power, (salvageable)

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (Including Report of Captured
Material).

~~SECRET~~

- 12 Paper, tar, rolls, (salvageable)
- 1 Vice, bench, (salvageable)
- 1 Grinder, bench, rusted, internal condition unknown
- 12 Hose, assorted, in short lengths
- 1 Extinguisher, "Simplex", one gallon, (salvageable)
- 1 Tank, fuel, can be repaired
- 1 Engine, fuel pump, gas driven
- 1 Hoist, one-ton chain, (salvageable)
- 1 Generator, 15 KVA with direct connected exciter and is of 220-volt, 60-cycle type. Could possibly be driven by a jury-rigged prime mover, such as a truck engine.
- 1 Main switch board in fair condition
- 2 Telescopes; one 15 power with broken lens, one 25 power.
- 6 Trucks; two in operating condition - Chevrolet and Reo.
- 1 Searchlight, on truck, (broken)
- 2 Boats, fifty foot landing, (one serviceable)
- 1 Boat, whale, twenty foot, (serviceable)
- 2 Wherries, 18 foot, (poor condition)
- 1 Boat, rubber, 10-man capacity, (poor condition)
- 6 Motors, outboard, "Kinuta" trade-mark, 3/4 to 1 1/2 horsepower, (majority in good condition; remainder may be used for spare parts).
- 7 Gasoline, 58-gallon, "Shell", high-octane base, drums.
- 160 Flares, night carbide.
- 1 20 mm AA gun, (serviceable)
- 2 13 mm guns, (serviceable)
- 1 13 mm gun, dual mount, (serviceable)
- 1 Three inch gun, (may be used for spare parts)
- 1 Marine Railway, (serviceable)
- 100 Bombs, aerial, 500-pound, with detonators.
- 1,000 Globes, lantern, "Hurricane" type.
- 1 Dock -- 215 ft. long, 38 ft. wide. At edge of dock water is 16 ft. deep at mean tide Ten ft. from dock water is 25 ft. deep at mean tide. There is an obstruction at one end of dock caused by a sunken tank-lighter.

NOTE: There were no supplies reported captured on GAVUTU or TANAMBOGO.

ANNEX D (Cont)

Intelligence Report, TULAGI Group, (including Report of Captured
Material).

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IV. FLORIDA

A. There were reported to be several detachments of from 12 to 15 men on this Island. In addition to these, several Japanese stationed on TULAGI, GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO escaped to FLORIDA on the day of our attack, according to prisoners. Mopping-up operations are still being carried out on this Island.

B. Captured Material

- 1 Radio, transmitting and receiving equipment, portable, operating on frequencies from 4,000 to 12,000 kilocycles, (serviceable).

800 Gasoline, aviation, 90-Octane, gallons.

C. Captured Prisoners

1. The following Japanese were captured on FLORIDA:

(1)	NOHARA, Giichi	1st Class Fireman
(2)	IKEBUTSU, Daizaburo	1st Class Cook
(3)	TSUGAWA, Shiro	1st Class Sailor (gunner)
(4)	HASHIMOTO, Shinya	Construction Corps Head

V. SONGONANGONG

A. One company landed and occupied this Island with slight opposition.

B. No material or supplies were found on this Island.

VI. MABANGAI

A. One company landed and occupied this Island with slight opposition.

B. No material or supplies were found on this Island.

W. H. RUPERTUS

ANNEX E

First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
Wellington, N.Z.

OPERATION ORDER

No. 7-42.

Maps: H.O. CHART # 2896 (Solomon Islands) reproduced by
D-2 Section.

D-2 Section Map North Coast Guadalcanal Island -
Lunga Point to Aola, 9 Sections, 15 July, 1942,
RF 1/24,000.

D-2 Section Map Tulagi and adjacent islands, 7/14/42,
(4 sheets), RF 1/12,000, 15 July, 1942.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) COMBAT GROUP A Col. LeRoy P. Hunt, USMC.
(less Combat Team #2 (less Btry E 11th Marines)
- (b) COMBAT GROUP B Col. Clifton B. Cates, USMC.
- (c) TULAGI GROUP LtCol. Merritt A. Edson, USMC.
1st Raider Bn
Combat Team #2 (less Btry E 11th Marines)
- (d) GAVUTU GROUP Maj. Robert H. Williams, USMC.
First Parachute Battalion
- (e) SUPPORT GROUP Col. Pedro A. del Valle, USMC.
1st Eng Bn (less Cos A, B, & C)
11th Marines (less 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Bns)
1st Spl Wpns Bn (less 1st & 3d Pl Btry A)
1st Pion Bn (less Cos A & B)
- (f) DIVISION RESERVE Col. John M. Arthur, USMC.
2d Marines (Reinforced) (less Combat Team A)
- (g) FLORIDA GROUP Maj. Robert E. Hill, USMC.
Combat Team A.
- (h) THIRD DEFENSE BATTALION Col. Robert H. Pepper, USMC.

ANNEX E (Cont)

AE-0010

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1. See Annex A Intelligence.
Naval Attack Force will furnish naval gunfire and air support (see Annexes B and C gunfire and air support plans respectively). Minesweepers will cover landing of FLORIDA GROUP by concentrations on BUNGANA Island and GAVUTU.
2. This Division will attack and destroy the hostile garrisons of TULAGI, GUADALCANAL, GAVUTU, and MAKAMBO by simultaneous landings on D day. It will then organize and defend those islands.
For Transport Area, Line of Departure, beaches, objectives, boundaries see Operation Overlay Annex D.
3. (a) Land on Beach RED at Zero Hour with 2 CTs in assault on a front of 1600 yards seize beachhead (see operation overlay). When passed through by Combat Group B, Combat Group A (less CTs #2 & 3) attack toward LUNGA with its right resting on the shore line. Seize the line of the TENARU RIVER. Combat Team #3 attack and seize line of woods running southeast from TENAVATU (see operation overlay). Hold that line until relieved by Support Group. Then operate as directed by Task Organization Commander.

(b) Land on Beach RED at Zero hour plus 50 minutes (see operation overlay) pass through right of Combat Group A and attack on magnetic azimuth 260°. Seize grassy knoll 4 miles south of LUNGA POINT. Be prepared for further advance. Formation - Column of battalions echeloned to left rear. Maintain contact with Combat Group A on right.

(c) Land on front of 500 yards on Beach BLUE at H hour, and seize that portion of TULAGI ISLAND lying northwest of line A (see D-2 Section Special Map TULAGI 1/12,000, 15 July 42). Fire GREEN STAR CLUSTER to call for five minutes air and naval bombardment of TULAGI southeast of Line A, after H plus 1 hour. Upon completion of bombing and lifting of naval gunfire, attack and seize the remainder of TULAGI ISLAND. Upon completion seizure of TULAGI ISLAND 1st Raider Bn reembark at Beach BLUE and report completion reembarkation to Division Headquarters, prepared for further landings.

(d) Land on east coast of GAVUTU ISLAND at H plus 4 hours, and seize that island, then seize TANAMBOGO. Fire GREEN STAR CLUSTER to call for five minutes naval gunfire on TANAMBOGO ISLAND. Reembark upon relief prepared for employment elsewhere.

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ANNEX E (2)

ANNEX E (Cont)

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(e) Land on Beach RED on order, assume control of 2d and 3d Battalions 11th Marines, provide artillery support for the attack, and coordinate AA and close in ground defense of Beachhead area.

(f) Be prepared to land Combat Team B less all reinforcing units on GAVUTU ISLAND at H plus 4 hours. Be prepared to attach Combat Team C less all reinforcing units to the TULAGI GROUP.

(g) Land 1st Battalion 2nd Marines (less one rifle company and one machine gun platoon) on promontory at x3022 at H hour plus 30 minutes and seize village of HALAVO. Then support by fire the attack of 1st Parachute Bn on GAVUTU. Land one (1) rifle company reinforced by one machine gun platoon at H minus 20 minutes in cove at W7837 and seize and hold point to southeast thereof.

(h) Execute following on order:

- (1) Land Battalion Less 1/3 AA elements on Beach RED. These pass to control CO Support Group on landing. Assist in AA defense of beach area.
- (2) Land 1/3 AA elements on TULAGI and GAVUTU, and provide AA defense that area.

(X)(1) Land tanks with combat groups and move to cover near east boundary of beachhead. Tanks not to be committed except on division order.

(2) Land 1st and 3d Platoons Battery A Special Weapons Battalion on flanks of beach and furnish AA defense beach area, 1st Platoon to right 3d Platoon to left. These revert to battalion control upon landing of Headquarters 1st Special Weapons Battalion.

(3) Scout Cars will not land.

(4) All artillery of combat groups will be landed with those groups and pass to control 11th Marines upon landing 11th Marines Headquarters.

(5) Assistant Division Commander will command operations in TULAGI - GAVUTU - FLORIDA Area.

4. See Administrative Order.

5. (a) See Annex E, Signal Communication.

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ANNEX E (3)

ANNEX E (Cont)

(b) Command Posts afloat:

1st Mar Div	MC CAWLEY (AP10)
Combat Group A	AMERICAN LEGION (AP35)
Combat Group B	BARNETT (AP11)
TULAGI Group	APD
GAVUTU Group	HEYWOOD (AP12)
Support Group	HUNTER LIGGETT (AP27)
Division Reserve	CRESCENT CITY (AP40)
FLORIDA Group	PRESIDENT JACKSON (AP37)
3d Defense Bn	ZEILIN (AP9)

(c) Axes of Signal Communication all units:

CP afloat - locations ashore to be reported.

(d) Use local time, zone minus eleven (zone suffim letter Love), in all communications within Division.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:




W. C. JAMES,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

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ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE


SITUATIONS
OVERLAY SHOWING DISPOSITION
FOR NIGHT 8-9 AUGUST 1945
IN 8th MARINES
- 3 ACCOMPANY D-2 MAP 104

BEACH RED EXTENDED


BEACH RED



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ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE



SITUATIONS OVERLAY FOR
NIGHT 7-8 AUGUST, 1942
1st, 5th & 11th MARINES (Plus Pioneers)
TO ACCOMPANY D-2 MAP 104.



INTELLIGENCE ANNEX G

INTRODUCTION

This report is written largely from memory. Lack of other authority is due to the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, then Division Intelligence Officer, and First Sergeant Stephen Custer, Chief of Section, were killed the night of August 12-13 while on patrol. Lieutenant Colonel Edmund J. Buckley, present DIO, did not join the section until August 14.

Distribution of D-2 personnel prior to landing operations was as follows:

U.S.S. McCawley (Division Command Post)--With Group A (Advance Landing Unit), one officer, one draftsman, one scout and observer, and one clerk: Group B (Rear), Colonel Goettge, one interpreter, one First Sergeant, two scouts and observers, one draftsman, one still photographer, one motion picture photographer, one clerk.

U.S.S. Hunter Liggett (Photo-Liaison Unit)--One officer, one N.C.O.; three lithographers; one darkroom technician; one still photographer. (Unassigned), One officer, one private.

U.S.S. Barnet (First Marines)--One officer-interpreter, two scouts and observers.

U.S.S. American Legion (Fifth Marines)--One officer-interpreter, two scouts and observers.

U.S.S. Little (First Raider Battalion)--One private-liaison.

U.S.S. Heywood (First Parachute Battalion)--One still photographer - liaison.

U.S.S. Crescent City (Second Marines)--One liaison man.

U.S.S. Neville (ADC)--One officer; one warrant officer-interpreter; one N.C.O., one draftsman, one still photographer, one motion picture photographer; one scout and observer, one clerk.

Summary--Nine officers, including five interpreters, and 32 enlisted men.

At 0000/7 August 1942 ("H" Day), First Sergeant Custer opened the D-2 Journal. This journal began on the bridge of the McCawley and was brought ashore with the rear group. It formed the basis for the following report handwritten next morning at Colonel Goettge's direction:

ANNEX G (CONT)

~~SECRET~~
From: 0000/7 August 1942
To: 2400/7 August 1942

First Marine Division, F.M.F.
MC732, North Coast Guadalcanal

1. Enemy Situation at end of Period:

No knowledge of any enemy front line or forces. Deserted enemy positions in Kukum-Lunga Point-Tenaru areas. Combat Group A reports no contact with any enemy elements as yet. Second Battalion, First Marines, reported at 2245 Jap patrol of from 150 to 200 at Mc128 stampeding cattle into our battalion lines. No known enemy casualties or prisoners taken.

At 1322 and 1505 enemy bombers attacked transport vessel area from northwest.

2. Enemy Capabilities and Conclusions Therefrom:

It is probable that those remaining enemy armed forces have taken to bush areas behind grassy plains and coconut plantations to reorganize for possible guerrilla tactics. Enemy knowledge of thick bush terrain would lead to conclusion that surprise attacks might be expected by our troops advancing into Lunga Point-Kukum area.

(One source of great confusion in this initial stage lay in the fact that there were two different coastal strip maps (traced from the same photographs) being used for landing operations: the D-2 nine-sheet, and a similar three-sheet prepared by the Navy, a better looking but far more inaccurate job. This made for duplication of coordinates--Navy and Air personnel referred to their map and we to ours--and also prevented coordinates from being transposed to indicate the same position).

"D" plus 1 Day (0000/8 to 2400/8)--Colonel Goettge and Sergeant Custer followed by jeep the Fifth Marines who had reached the northern boundary of the airfield, still without opposition. From the Tenaru onwards, evidence of Japanese occupation increased: a sign or two, the recent grave of one "attached to naval personnel," KIA; and the deserted village of a labor camp.

In the afternoon, the first military prisoners, members of the naval landing force were brought into the C.P. In addition numerous labor battalion prisoners were brought in and examined. The day's report read:

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ANNEX G (2)

ANNEX G (CONT)

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From: 0000/8 August 1942
To: 2400/8 August 1942

First Marine Division
North Coast Guadalcanal--M4840

1. Enemy Situation at End of Period:

(a) Enemy forces remain in the inland areas and contact has not yet been established with them. Naval construction forces, which appear to have been unarmed, are believed to be in the inland areas and closer to our position. There appears to be a distinct line of demarkation between the enemy armed forces and their labor units.

(b) Enemy defensive works are comprised solely of anti-aircraft positions and trenches, all situated immediately in the rear of the beach line. There appears to be no organization in depth. All installations are well constructed. No obstacles have been located barring inland approaches.

(c) Minor contacts only were made. It is believed the enemy troops have yet to get organized for raids or other efforts in strength. Enemy troops believed to be of Class 1 and 2 reserve and average approximately 30 years of age.

(d) No artillery has been located.

(e) Location, strength and composition of enemy reserves unknown. It is not believed a reserve will be utilized in the type of combat conducted by the enemy.

(f) Vast amount of supplies, including trucks, tractors, cement mixers, cement, fuel stores, generators, electrical supplies, radio equipment and ordnance left intact by the enemy.

2. Enemy Operations During Period:

Minor contacts only were made with enemy forces during the night. Believe contacts of Combat Group A were result of enemy labor personnel seeking food. Main enemy forces in rear areas and not yet in contact with our forces. Prisoners report of armed strength as 300 is doubted. Considered to be below-actual strength.

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ANNEX G (3)

ANNEX G (CONT)

~~SECRET~~

3. Miscellaneous:

(a) Enemy casualties, including prisoners, estimated to be 18.

(b) Terrain not under our control is conducive to the employment of all tricks and ruses normally employed by enemy forces in combat. The enemy probably has knowledge of our location, but not of our exact strength except that it is considerable.

4. Enemy Capabilities:

The enemy can continue to remain in the rear areas awaiting reinforcements. Possible reinforcements could arrive from Rabaul (New Britain) in 39 hours. The time the enemy can so remain is limited because of the scarcity of food. The enemy can effect surprise attacks from positions in rear areas during the night or early morning. The enemy can infiltrate and attack small isolated groups at any time.

A briefer message sent out at 1915 to the Commanding Officers of the First, Fifth and 11th. and to CTF 62 (Commander Task Force) read:

"Prisoners reveal enemy forces Guadalcanal consisted two Navy construction battalions about 1800 men and under 500 troops. Contacts P.M. Lunga Point-Kukum area. Enemy capabilities confined to night raids and surprise attacks by day."

(The estimate of enemy strength prior to landing was as follows:

One Reinforced Infantry Regiment	2100
One Anti-aircraft Battalion	625
Labor Troops	2100
Air and Naval Detachment	<u>185</u>
Total Estimated enemy strength	5010

This was a heavy over-statement).

report: "D" plus 2 Days (0000/9 to 2400/9)--The third day's

From: 0000/9 August 1942
To: 2400/9 August 1942

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ANNEX G (4)

ANNEX G (CONT)

~~SECRET~~

First Marine Division
North Coast Guadalcanal (M4840)

1. Enemy Situations and Operations During Period:

Enemy forces can still remain in inland areas. Sporadic contacts only made with small scattered enemy units. Eleventh Regiment reported enemy machine-gun fire during night, and also contact with a small enemy patrol southeast of the airfield.

2. Miscellaneous:

No enemy prisoners reported. Small number of enemy forces, not over six, believed killed. Terrain not under our control still offers enemy forces opportunity for surprise raids and guerilla attacks on our outposts and patrols.

3. Capabilities:

Enemy believed to be still capable of infiltration and surprise attacks on small units of our own forces.

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUMENTS, METHODS AND PROCEDURE

Maps, Aerial Photos and Reproduction--The D-2 nine-sheet coastal strip map--the standard and only suitable one for use of lower echelons in the Guadalcanal operation--was somewhat inadequate. It dealt with the north coast of Guadalcanal (1/24,000 scale) and was completed 15 July, 1942. An M-square grid covered the whole area of the landing attacks on the larger M-2 map, N. Coastal Guadalcanal, 1/108643, 14 July 1942 (blown up from an Admiralty chart) and this grid was transposed on the coastal strip map and the operations map for Tulagi and adjacent islands. It was badly transposed, adding to the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the maps themselves. In criticism might be mentioned:

(a) Grid N was supposed to be true north. It wasn't, but no variation was indicated, thus preventing anyone in the field from orienting himself on the map.

(b) No graphic scale was appended.

(c) Distortion is inherent in aerial photography and tracings on a map--as in the case of the one under discussion--do not allow for these variations. This distortion could have been corrected by radial alignments.

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ANNEX G (CONT)

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(d) The map outlined beach and rivers, grass land, woods, and coconut plantations--traced however with only approximate accuracy--but included should have been such additional information as might have been obtained from the study of intelligence reports, and from further study of photographs. For example:

(1). The coastal road and such other roads and trails as were known or visible from latest pictures.

(2). Known buildings and such construction as bridges, fences, paddocks, etc. (In this connection, the "reported Orange airfield" was placed two by four between the mouth of the Lunga River and Lunga Lagoon. Actually,, the airfield, many times longer than it was wide, was some distance to the south).

(e) The map carried inadequate contours of terrain and insufficient approximate indications of height.

(f) Inland areas were insufficiently shown.

Aerial Photographs--Due to the fact that men and machines were not available during the first two months of the operations, adequate aerial photographs--necessary to show enemy targets and changing dispositions--could not be taken day by day.

Reproduction--Facilities were likewise not immediately available for the reproduction of maps. The reproduction unit had been conceived of as a shipboard unit. Once the U.S.S. Hunter Liggett had shoved off, this unit was no longer available. Reproduction equipment was not brought ashore until August 9. The men were ready to operate within 24 hours, thanks primarily to taking over the Kukum telephone exchange and an adjoining dark-room which had been left intact by the enemy.

JOURNAL, SITUATION MAP AND WORKSHEET: THE D-2 OFFICE

Maintenance of an adequate journal, centers about the telephonic communications and requires intelligent clerks. They should not have to be taught the fundamentals of their jobs during an operation. Names mean nothing in a journal, positions and local conditions mean everything. Consequently men must be trained to identify themselves by position and post.

The D-2 journal for the first three days is incomplete. It was not until the beginning of October that the enemy situation could be illustrated on an overlay kept up to date in orthodox manner. A daily worksheet was also slow in forthcoming--the men were too preoccupied with immediate tasks. But with the help of the Journal, D-2 kept quite abreast of the situation.

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ANNEX G (CONT)

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND RECONNAISSANCE

"D" Day on Guadalcanal was notable for absence of enemy contact but on the following day, as the attack swept inland, the DIC and the First Sergeant were out surveying captured material and members of the D-2 section spent most of the day investigating and reporting on the situation. This reconnaissance supplemented the accounts received from combat groups. Morning and evening, when the situation demanded, D-2 relayed the picture to the C.O's. of the First, Fifth and 11th, and to CTF 62. A motor-driven two-masted schooner was reported anchored offshore west of Kukum. This was relayed to D-2, thence to CTF 62 by radio and DD was sent to the spot and sank the schooner.

THE ENEMY

Captured equipment, documents and effects, and the prisoners of war--D-2 learned much about the Jap himself as troops took over his home and his belongings, much of his military equipment and a great engineering project. Much of the materiel captured early was of little use in a military sense.

Equipment--First, the equipment of the military garrison, which, as prisoners revealed, consisted of some 600 armed men--a considerably lower number than estimated in Phase I. Their insignia was the anchor and chrysanthemum of the Naval landing force. In their flight westward, they left enough weapons, ammunition and gear to show how they were clothed and armed. Most of them carried the .25 calibre bolt action, clip fed long rifle, though a few short ones with sling on the side were found. This is a serviceable weapon with high muzzle velocity and well designed for bayonet fighting by short and stocky individuals. Different issues had different sights, the latest being a large peep battle sight and leaf, permitting quick sighting. The sling was of a lacquered tight web. A cleaning rod snapped into the stock below the barrel. Items which demanded quality were of the finest material and workmanship, and all items adequately met the demands of actual service. The bayonet was of good steel, distinguished from ours by the hook. Three cartridge cases were carried on the leather belt, two small ones containing 30 rounds each and a larger one containing 60 rounds.

Automatic weapons were the .25 calibre light machine-gun and heavy .303 Hotchkiss type MG with carrying handles and fed by interlocking brass clips. For heavier weapons there were several three-inch guns, several 25 AA and guns in single and multiple mountings, all disposed along the coastal fringe.

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ANNEX G (CONT)

~~SECRET~~

Clothing--Uniforms of both the naval landing force and the labor personnel fell into our hands. The former consisted of whites, blues and dungarees. For garrison duty leggings were worn, rifle, belt, bayonet and canteen carried, and a regular helmet provided, without the army star but with a cloth cover bearing the naval insignia in front. Landing force troops had khaki uniforms and helmets and simple haversacks with adjustable shoulder straps secured by a cord at the top. Dungarees of fighting troops were like ours, two pieces and green, but of a lighter weave.

The labor battalions, of which there were two--the 11th. and 13th.--encamped at Lunga and Kukum respectively, were entirely separate from the garrison, though the ranking officers were drawn from the navy. Each battalion numbered about 900 men, and was divided into groups of 80 under a foreman and subdivided in turn. These men were unarmed and non-combatant. Unlike our Seabees, they were physically poor specimens of low civilian attainment, declared unfit for military service and conscripted for manual labor. Their uniform was a two piece drab khaki cotton utility with a white cloth identification patch on the front of the jacket. Black, ankle-high canvas shoes had rubber soles and split toes and buckled in the back. Many had cheap Japanese raincoats of coconut fibre which often were mistaken for snipers' camouflage suits.

Food--Huge quantities of rice in 100-lb. woven straw bags were seized. It was unpolished and promptly used by the Marines. Tea and hardtack were found. The hardtack was superior to our own. Add to these dried kelp and noodles and a fine variety of canned foods. Large stores of Saki and beer were found. The Saki was destroyed and the beer impounded for general issue. Of considerable interest were the concentrated naval rations in candy form, which apparently served the purpose of our "D" Ration and was packed in packages the size of cigarette packs.

Material--The Japs' quarters were simple but comfortable. Tent encampments were well-policed and clean, blending with the terrain. All were healthy and well-drained. The men slept six to eight in a tent on duckboards covered with mats. Light grey blankets were provided for the men and heavier orange ones for the officers. Green mosquito nets covering a whole tent were usually provided.

The men were scrupulously clean. Their sick bays were well stocked. Power and refrigerator plants were in evidence.

There were a number of 2½ ton, two-wheel drive trucks, either 1938 model Chevrolet or a corresponding Jap make, and a few smaller staff sedans, either Jap or 1937 model Ford.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX G (CONT)

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Engineering equipment was too complex and varied to be inventoried its entirety. It was put to prompt use by our own troops, and such items as rollers, mixers, radar equipment, surveying and assaying instruments, power, pumping and refrigeration machinery, electrical supplies, cement, lumber, steel, girder and plates for hangars, and large fuel stores were of great value to us.

Papers--Large numbers of documents were found. Blueprints and anything of engineering, surveying or aerological use were turned over to the Division Engineer or Air Liaison. Military and technical tables were examined and kept for transmittal. Paymasters' records, books and accounts were captured, together with personnel files. Seized also were huge stacks of regular Japanese currency, and the printed invasion scrip.

Numerous technical and training manuals, of a restricted nature but all prior to 1940, were examined. Ledgers, accounts, leases, and other documents pertaining to the British Solomons, were recaptured.

Maps seized had little military value since we could already see what they depicted.

Effects--Among the personal documents captured were whole school courses written in extensive notes accompanied by drawings and diagrams in their notebooks. These courses covered not only all military and technical subjects but foreign languages as well.

Every man kept a diary. Some were just notebooks but the majority were the larger ledgers designed for men in the service. They were veritable almanacs, containing seasonal information, religious daily dozen, military reminders, maps and pictures, all designed to glorify Japan. The writer, making entries, put in everything he did and was at pains to mark his personal odyssey on the maps, revealed his care of health and the situation at home, his impression of his duties, his fellows and the land in which he was stationed. These diaries, and those subsequently captured were the source of valuable combat intelligence information.

The First Prisoners--During this phase, the few prisoners taken on the second day were our sole prisoners of war during this period. The prisoners had little information of a military nature except to establish the fact that there were few combat troops on the island.

On 8 August personal contact was established with the D-2 men attached to the First and Fifth regiments on Guadalcanal. They were operating as members of the H-2 sections as liaison with the Division and participating in scouting and patrolling, and

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX G (CONT)

~~SECRET~~

keeping the situation maps. They returned to D-2 at Colonel Goettge's request on August 12, while two officers remained with their units as regimental interpreters.

Attached personnel for the landing attacks on Tulagi and adjacent islands carried out their assignments. Two enlisted men attached to D-2 took active part in operations of the Paratroopers and Raiders.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the first criticisms coming to mind as a result of the foregoing survey is the absence of coordination of intelligence personnel. Members of D-2, R-2 and Bn-2 sections showed a lack of common training.

Next is the lack of general and specific knowledge among the section leaders of the situation, not only as regards the objectives of our landing attacks but concerning the theatre of operations as a whole. The most elementary facts of Solomons Islands geography were a mystery to most, not only when we landed, but even after we had been on Guadalcanal for weeks. A clear understanding of the situation and the related theatre of war should be impressed upon all personnel in intelligence activities.

Equipment should (1) be reduced to an efficient combat minimum and (2) it should be portable. A portable typewriter is adequate for all purposes. Field desks should be designed for strength and to save space. Nothing that cannot be hand carried should be taken. Maximum standards of size and weight should be set--nothing heavier than a two-man lift. Handles should be constructed so that they do not crush the hands of men.

Photographic gear comprised a large percentage of the bulky boxes on the Guadalcanal operation. A photo-litho trailer was left in Wellington. It would have been invaluable. Another trailer for the photographic unit should also be made available.

~~SECRET~~

MEDICAL ANNEX H

The landing from a medical point of view was uneventful. Battalion and Regimental medical sections carried only combat equipment--units 1-10, 11A, brandy, biologicals, extra morphine and sulpha drugs. In some cases individual groups disregarded the letter of this order and overloaded their personnel with equipment in excess of this amount. This disregard of a carefully planned section of the operation order was to prove a serious handicap during the following forty-eight hours and contributed to the loss of small amounts of valuable medical supplies and much hardship to the medical personnel.

The reserve supplies assigned to units named in Phase I, in the case of the Regimental sections were turned over to the supply sections of the Medical Companies before the zero hour. Thus the combat units actually engaged in the beachhead operation were not responsible for any supplies except those actually carried by their own personnel.

The timing of the Landing of Medical Companies, following Combat Groups, was well handled, and all medical companies hit the beach at approximately the same time (1030 to 1100) and at a time when the beach had been cleared and the unloading of ships had begun. The following twenty-four hours was taken up with the slow advance through the jungle and along the shore, and the medical companies, following them succeeded in maintaining contact with the forward echelons. No collecting stations or field hospitals were set up at this time, for the operations order called for the evacuation of all casualties to be via the beach to the ships as long as they remained in the immediate vicinity. The shore to ship evacuation was coordinated by the Division Surgeon and a medical liaison officer assigned by the Transport Group Surgeon.

Supplies and equipment were handled in essentially the same manner for all medical companies. Detachments of the supply sections were left aboard the transports to supervise and direct the unloading. Larger detachments were sent to the beach to collect and establish medical supply depots. It was at this point that the first real difficulty became apparent. Although ships in Wellington had been properly combat loaded as far as medical priority was concerned, the reloading at Korô was done without the sanction or knowledge of the Division medical supply section and all the reserve supplies carried by H&S Company, First Medical Battalion were placed in the bottoms of the holds. This not only delayed the securing of supplies, but accounted for the fact that much necessary equipment was never unloaded and left with the ships. Particularly was this important in the case of refrigeration equipment. Because of this lack of proper regulation of temperature, all biologicals, with the exception of some few which do not require refrigeration, were lost by spoiling, even though landed and placed in storage underground.

ANNEX H (Cont)

At 1155, 8 August, the third enemy air attack resulted in the eventual sinking of the USS George F Elliott and with the loss of all medical supplies and equipment with the exception of a few combat units, under the supervision of "E" Company, First Medical Battalion. In spite of this loss, the preparatory division of supplies had been so well done that no shortage of supplies resulted. Many enemy supplies were captured with the hospital in the Tenaru area. From this and Division Reserves, it was possible to reoutfit this Medical Company, and it was able to function as a field hospital within 48 hours after landing.

At the time of the withdrawal of friendly naval forces from the area Regimental and battalion aid stations in both the combat groups and in the supporting groups had been established in their own areas. "B" Company, First Medical Battalion, had begun the occupation of two wooden buildings in an area north of the airfield which would accommodate 100 patients. The First Platoon of "A" Company, and "E" Company, First Medical Battalion were setting up tent hospitals in essentially the same area about 500 yards east of what was to be the division field hospital.

During the previous sixty hours some important facts had been learned. Perhaps the most outstanding lesson was the troops as well as medical personnel were attempting to carry too much weight on their persons. Much equipment, both military and medical were lost during the first two days simply because the individual could not continue on the march with this excess gear. Handcarts were absolutely useless, particularly where the numbers of men were small and relief not available. Almost at once it was noticed that units suspended at the side were continually being caught up in the vines of jungle trails. Lack of proper amounts of water was almost a tragedy. In spite of all water from ships containing 1/10 of 1% salt in solution, salt tablets carried only by medical personnel were insufficient, to replace the salt loss of men who had not had conditioning exercise for weeks. Bulky packages cannot be carried on jungle trails and transportation cannot be expected for three to four days.

Difficulties in the supply section can briefly be stated as "the time factor." Improper reloading at Koro was a serious handicap, but if there had been more time complete unloading would have been accomplished. It should be said that during the next 3 months all of this equipment and supplies eventually did arrive on the island with the exception of those supplies lost aboard the USS Elliott. There was some loss of alcohol and brandy with co-incident loss of other equipment due to opening of units..

The casualties suffered in the landing on Gavutu were treated in aid stations and evacuated back to the ships as boats became available. Reports of heavy casualties in the northern attack resulted in the ordering of the second platoon of "A"

ARTILLERY ANNEX I

PHASE II

Artillery operations during phase II were generally satisfactory. All units reached their assigned positions and at approximately the planned times. The planned fires were not executed as no resistance was encountered.

The most serious errors of this phase were as follows:

(1) Communications were established too slowly, and wire communications were impossible to maintain because of activities of trucks and amphibian tractors. Radio was not satisfactory. The TBY radio is practically useless, and TBX operators were out of practice and the sets out of calibration. All wire lines near the beach should be overheaded initially.

(2) Entirely too much equipment was taken ashore in the initial landing. The initial equipment and supplies should be restricted to essential combat equipment, ammunition, and rations. Only after the beachhead is secured should additional equipment and supplies be landed.

(3) Prime movers for the general support battalion (105mm howitzers) were not landed initially, due to shortage of ramp boats. Amphibian tractors, loaded initially with 105mm ammunition, were used as prime movers after reaching the beach. This resulted in considerable loss of time for both artillery and boats, as no prime movers were available to pull the howitzers ashore when the boats beached. The 105mm battalion was seriously handicapped until its prime movers were landed, many hours later. Except in extreme cases, artillery should never be separated from its prime movers.

(4) The one (1) ton truck, used as a prime mover for the 105mm howitzer, is not heavy enough for the task. 2½ ton, 6x6 trucks are authorized and must be provided if this unit is to operate efficiently. Suitable ramp boats must be provided for this prime mover.

(5) A shortage of officers and of communication personnel resulted because of a call to furnish naval gunfire observers and their parties. These observers and their parties should be provided for in the tables of organization, and should be especially trained artillerymen, not naval personnel. The training necessary to make a field soldier out of a naval officer far exceeds that necessary to make a naval gunfire observer of a trained artillery officer.

(6) More pioneer equipment, particularly machetes, shovels, and crosscut saws, should be provided all artillery units.

ANNEX I (Cont)

(7) Infantry landed on an occupied beach can run or crawl to cover, and take up combat positions. The artillery, hampered by unwieldy material, must have some degree of freedom on the beach in order to clear the area without exorbitant losses. Artillery is ineffective until such time as the infantry has advanced to the artillery minimum range line, which was approximately 1800 yards from the original positions on Beach RED.

(8) Advance on D plus one day involved crossing the Ilu River at its mouth, and many vehicles were stalled. Traffic control at this point should have been established, and provision for this should be made in the future.

(9) No. artillery forward observer lines should go through infantry switchboards.

ANNEX J

LOGISTICS

Engineer Bn.

On landing, all engineer troops not attached to combat teams were to be utilized in conjunction with the available portion of the service battalion in defense of the beachhead to the south and east, a perimeter of several thousand yards. Positions to accomplish this mission were occupied during the afternoon of 7 August and maintained during the night.

Construction work of engineer troops during the first day consisted of laying the "amphibian tractor" bridge across the Ilu River (0886-1997). The remainder of the available engineers assisted in the unloading at the beach and in the aforementioned defense until 8 August, when it was relieved and on 9 August moved to bivouac at the captured airport. On this day a detachment of H&S company constructed a bridge of the ten-ton temporary pier at the mouth of the Ilu River, at the sand spit (0873-2004) a span of some 90 feet. This was removed as soon as passage of all supplies had been effected. Another group began checking captured equipment on the airfield with the view to its use in completion of the runway. All Engineer Battalion troops, except one platoon of "A" Company, which was supporting the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines on Tulagi, returned to Battalion control on this date.

Motor Transport

During the unloading at Red Beach motor transport could not function at first due to lack of vehicles. The personnel were used first to get the organic transportation of the combat teams unloaded and into operation. All vehicles were utilized in getting ammunition, water and rations to the forward elements and in getting the beach cleared of inflammables.

It was necessary to immobilise certain vehicles due to lack of personnel and equipment with which to effect repairs, for the repair section and its equipment were not unloaded. Many of the Jap trucks on the island had been rendered unserviceable by our own bombing and Naval gunfire, but approximately 35 were put into running condition and placed under division control. These were all of the 2x4 type and consequently unserviceable on wet roads in the area. These were all kept running as long as the few spare parts found on the island held out. Four sedans, five motorcycles and about forty bicycles were salvaged from captured equipment and placed in Division motor transport pool for assignment.

ANNEX J (Cont)

Pioneers

By 1500 on D day, all units of the pioneers (less two platoons left aboard AK-23 as an unloading detail, and one platoon with the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, on Tulagi) were ashore and under Battalion control. The labor supply on the beach was entirely inadequate, and the shore party was unable to keep abreast of the boats as they came ashore from the transports. Late in the afternoon of 7 August a message had to be sent to the ships to delay unloading, for it was impossible to allocate additional troops to the unloading details because of the uncertainty of the Division's position. The next day much the same conditions prevailed, although some respite was gained when the ships had to suspend unloading because of air attack. It was planned to extend the beach further west on the ninth, but the ships did not return. The ninth therefore marked the beginning of a five day period of moving equipment into the Lunga Kukum area, and sorting out the equipment of various units.

AVIATION ANNEX K

PHASE II

Aircraft assigned to the First Marine Division were the planes from the Astoria, Vincennes and Quincy. The three from the Astoria were for liaison for the Guadalcanal attack; three from the Vincennes for liaison for Tulagi attack; three from the Quincy for artillery spotting missions in the Guadalcanal operation. During the ship to shore movement the liaison planes marked the extremities of the landing beaches with smoke bombs to assist naval gunfire support and to guide the boats to the proper beaches. This use of liaison planes is unwarranted and although objected to by the Division Air Officer CTF 62 persisted in use. To "accurately mark the extremities of the landing beaches" as directed by the operation order for twenty minutes required for each beach, eight runs at exceptionally low altitudes, four on each extremity. This practice if conducted against a beach with any defense would eliminate the liaison plane at the crucial moment when troops are landing and information of progress is vital to the Landing Force Commander. Granted the liaison plane could be replaced but not until considerable time had been lost while the replacement plane arrived on station. Furthermore smoke is a poor means of marking beaches as fires may be started by gunfire, bombs or even by the enemy which might be mistaken by our forces and cause the entire force to land on the wrong beach.

Little information was furnished by the liaison planes as there was little to be seen or could be seen from the air. Some messages received were ambiguous and required additional messages to be sent to clarify the situation, thus cluttering up the already overtaxed communication network with unnecessary messages. Had trained personnel been available for this liaison work this would have been avoided. One example was a message "Many troops in area". What area? Whose troops? What were they doing? These questions were asked the liaison plane. Finally back came the reply. "Message so and so troops are cattle".

The observers that were employed in this operation were inexperienced but were the only ones available to the Division. It is believed that trained aerial observers should be attached to the Division as is done in the case of artillery spotters. Six observers should be assigned per division.

With the loss of the Astoria, Quincy and Vincennes the Division lost its liaison planes and the spotting planes. The loss was not vital to the operation as positions were being consolidated at that time. However, planes would have been valuable in reconnaissance between the phase and Phase IV.

ANNEX L

FSC/ejf. Fifth Marines, First Marine Division,
C/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

20 February, 1943.

RECORD OF EVENTS:

August 7 - Friday

H-4 Reveille for all units.
Jap gasoline dump is ignited on beach by naval gun fire.

0910(H-hr) The First Battalion landed on the right half of Red Beach on a front of 800 yards. No opposition encountered.

0927 The Third Battalion landed on a front of 800 yards and established the left half of the beach-head line. No resistance was encountered on the landing.

0938 Regimental Headquarters landed on Red Beach and proceeded about 100 yards inland and established its 1st C.P.

0940 Weapons Company landed on Red Beach (66-155.5) to (67.7-115.5) and took position as Regimental Reserve about 200 yards from the beach.

1100 Aviation reported large concentrations of enemy west of Lunga River. Exact location not stated.

1115 First Regiment passed through right half of beach-head line held by the Fifth.

1140 Weapons Company moved inland about 450 yards and took position as security for Regimental C.P.

1400 The First Battalion was ordered to move westward with the right flank on the beach. Ordered to take up a defensive position for the night on the east bank of the Tenaru River.

First Battalion moved out, crossing Ilu River at 1600

As First Battalion, Weapons Company and Regimental Headquarters moved west toward the Tenaru, Third Battalion was given the mission of securing the left (east) flank of the Division beach-head.

1400 All units warned to expect an air raid at 1430.

18 enemy bombers reported to have left Rabaul.

1430 18 enemy bombers passed overhead and attacked friendly ships. No hits observed.

1500 After several rest periods the Weapons Company arrived at a point 600 yards inland from Red Beach as security for new Regimental C.P.

1830 First Battalion reached line of Tenaru River, and stopped, establishing an all around defense for the night.

There had been no enemy contact during the day, nor was there any at night.

1900 Weapons Company took new positions with H&S personnel as bivouac security for new Regimental C.P., 800 yards SW of Red Beach.

ANNEX L (Cont)

RECORD OF EVENTS:
FIFTH MARINES.

CONTINUED

During the night, troops fired intermittently because of nervous tension. Two casualties resulted.

August 8, 1942:

0930 The First Battalion, supported by a tank company, crossed the Tenaru without opposition. Enemy was first contacted in village of Lunga Lagoon. Snipers and patients were found in the Jap Sick Bay. Corporal Bates D. McClean, "B" Co., First Battalion captured the first Jap prisoner in the campaign.

The Third Battalion continued to hold the left half of the beach-head line in defense of the eastern sector of Red Beach. No enemy encountered.

1215 Enemy bombers and torpedo planes attacked our transports and screening ships off Red Beach. Hits observed on a destroyer and a transport.

1330 First Battalion reached airfield and found it undefended. There were quantities of building equipment, abandoned with no apparent effort at destruction.

1430 Fifth Regiment ordered to proceed across Lunga and seize area between Lunga River and Kukum Creek. Movement executed immediately.

From the beach the Weapons Company proceeded as advance guard of the Regiment and marched to a road adjacent to the airfield followed the road westward to the bridge across the Lunga River.

The Weapons Company halted along the road at the bridge and small arms fire was directed at the trees and bushes on the opposite side of the river. There was no return fire. The Regiment, with Colonel Hunt leading, then crossed the bridge without incident.

The main Jap camp was between the Lunga and Kukum. Large quantities of food, ammunition, camp equipment, motor transport, electric and radio installations were captured intact. The enemy had apparently fled in great haste. Only material damage noted was that caused by our naval gunfire prior to the landing.

1600 Small group (6-8) of Japs fired upon by elements of First Battalion. About half were killed and the others disappeared into the jungle. No other enemy contacted.

1700 Captain Gately, Weapons Company, ordered to patrol across Kukum River. Two of the enemy were seen fleeing. No other enemy, and no defensive positions, located by this patrol.

During the night, heavy naval gunfire was heard to the north, apparently near Savo. Enemy aviation dropped flares over Red Beach.

ANNEX L (Cont)

RECORD OF EVENTS:

FIFTH MARINES.

CONTINUED

Troops still nervous at night and fire upon slight provocation. One casualty resulted.

August 9, 1942:-Sunday.

A.M. First Battalion established a beach defense from east branch of Lunga to 1000 yards west of Kukum Creek. Enemy aviation reconnaissance active over this sector but no bombs dropped.

A patrol spotted a rowboat, 200 yards west of Kukum Dock with six Japs soldiers in it. Five of these were killed. The sixth escaped.

An Intelligence party from Regiment under First Lieutenant Cory made an inspection of Jap N.O.B. at Kukum. This appeared to be a naval unit HQ., and supply dump. Large quantities of ammunition, communication equipment, lumber, sand bags, and digging tools were found intact.

Beach at Kukum had been defended by a "3" naval A.A. gun, a .55 cal, MG., a 1" pom pom AA gun, and two 37mm AT guns. All were put in operating order and manned by our troops.

First Battalion developed and dug in defense position at Lunga Point.

All was quiet for the Third Battalion on this date and strong positions were dug. Some natives came thru the lines. Battalion was ordered to send all but 50 men to beach as working party. Relieved in the afternoon to return to defensive positions.

The Weapons Company spent this day in shaking down and in making a reconnaissance of the immediate area.

F. S. CAREY,
1stLieut., U.S. Marine Corps,
Ass't R-3.

ANNEX L (Cont)

Second Battalion,
Fifth Marines, First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force, C/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

17 February, 1943.

RECORD OF EVENTS

August 7, 1942 Entire Combat Team, 45 Officers and 1040 Enlisted men, landed on Beach Blue of Tulagi Island at 0916. C P established west of cemetery. No opposition to the landing was encountered. Companies moved into the previously designated assembly areas, reporting no opposition. Company "F" moved into the north-west portion of the Island and reported no enemy. At 1000, Company "E" was ordered to move from its assembly area to the high ground overlooking SASAPI at W935418 and assisted, by fire, Company "B" of the First Raider Battalion as that company advanced along the North Shore trail. Lieutenant Colonel Rosecrans moved forward to join Colonel Edson of the Raider Battalion at his C P on hill 301. Company "E" reported that SASAPI had been evacuated by the enemy, leaving a drydock and two boats under construction. Five natives (man, wife and three children) were brought into the C P and gave some information of the enemy; natives' estimate was that about 400 of the enemy were on Tulagi Island. At 1100 the First Platoon of Company "H" was ordered to move forward to hill 208, W943365, and attack the enemy by fire. At 1300 the Platoon was displaced forward to the area W938364 and continued its fire on the enemy until the Platoon was withdrawn at sunset to its previous position. At 1300, Company "G" was ordered to move towards the south-east part of the Island along the ridge trail, and was committed on the left flank of the Raiders in the general area W9637. Hidden machine gun nest opened up and Company "G" sustained five casualties, one dead and four wounded, in the area W9736. At 1400 the Battalion C P was moved forward to the Police Barracks. Advanced C P moved forward to Residency Building at W970368. At 1345 the Mortar Platoon was ordered to move from its position at W910405 forward to W937369. About 1400 an air raid was observed on the ships off Guadalcanal. At 1715, Company "E" reported snipers and heavy machine gun fire in New Chinatown, holding up Company "B" of the Raider Battalion. The Third Platoon of Company "H" was ordered, at 1745, to relieve Company "E" and that Company ordered to prepare to embark at nightfall from Blue Beach and proceed to Gavutu. However, this order was recalled and Company "E" spent the remainder of the night in the vicinity of Blue Beach. At 1745 the shore party was called to bring up twenty stretchers for the removal of casualties. At 2330 the advanced C P post was moved along the trail to a point at W966368, heavy crossfire making the previous position untenable.

ANNEX L (Cont)

RECORD OF EVENTS:

2nd BN, FIFTH MARINES.

CONTINUED

August 8, 1942 Just before daybreak heavy machine gun fire plus rifle fire and numerous grenade explosions, covered the area of the C P and the area previously occupied, but no casualties were sustained; and at about 0600 the C P was moved down alongside the Mortar Platoon position in the vicinity of W935367, where it remained all day. At 0715, Company "E" was moved from its position north of Hill 208 to the general area W9535 to mop up remaining Jap snipers. 17 Japanese who caused the disturbance around the C P the previous night were trapped in the house at W970360, killed and the building burned down. Company "E" moved along the Ridge Trail down a draw to government Wharf, and thence along trail on beach side of Island and established itself on the south-west end of the Island. Company "F" moved into the general area W9436, and mopping up operations continued during which few casualties were sustained and many Japanese were blasted out of caves with TNT and hand grenades. Native huts on the West side of Hill 208 were burned down and also other buildings which might have provided shelter for Japanese snipers still on the island. About 30 casualties of the First Raider Battalion were cleared through the Second Battalion Sick-Bay, carried into boats and sent aboard the USS Neville. At 1000, two battalions of the Second Marines landed on Beach Blue and occupied the north-west half of the island. Sniper fire was received from Hill 208, and a Platoon of Company "H" in position on the hill located the snipers and killed same, total of four snipers. The house where the snipers had been taking cover was burned down. About 1345, another air raid on the ships was observed. One enemy plane, shot down, crashed into the AP Elliot and set it afire. Smoke was observed pouring from the ship all day. Company "G" continued mopping up and discovered a great number of snipers in a cave in a cut in the vicinity of W983363.

August 9, 1942 About 0145 this morning a naval battle was observed south-west of Tulagi. Several big explosions seen. Battle moved off towards the west and nothing else observed. At 0700, a Platoon of Company "H" went to the Government Wharf to unload supplies coming in. Men from Company "G" also released for same purpose. At 0705, Mortar Platoon was ordered to move to area W9535 in position to fire on southwestern end of island. At 1030, the C P moved up into vicinity of Government Residency. Demolition squads active in blowing out caves that still hide a few Japanese snipers. At 1240 the Mortar Platoon laid a ten minute concentration on Mbangai Island, while two companies of the Second Battalion, Second Marines landed and cleaned out the few remaining Japanese snipers. Supplies and equipment from ships being landed all day. Battery "E", landed about 1400. Conference called at 1500 to organize southeast Tulagi

ANNEX L (Cont)

RECORD OF EVENTS:

2nd BN, FIFTH MARINES.

CONTINUED

August 9, 1942 defense. Lieutenant Colonel Edson, commanding
sector, Lieutenant Colonel Rosecrans executive officer and Major Fuller Bn - 3. Orders for organization and defense of Southeast Tulagi issued.

ANNEX M

FIRST MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE.

"HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT"

PHASE II

(H hour 7 August--evening 9 August)

In accordance with instructions contained in Regimental Operations Order No. 4-42, the first wave of the Regiment landed on Beach Red at 0930. Order of landing as follows: CT 5, CT 6, CT 4. Formation: in column.

After landing, the Regiment in the same order as above and echeloned to the right rear, passed through the right of Combat Group A and advanced toward Grassy Knoll on a magnetic azimuth of 240 degrees. By the end of the day all three battalions had reached positions along the eastern bank of the Ilu River. With the exception of a Japanese patrol reported in the vicinity of the First Battalion at 2200, no enemy activity had been observed since debarking from the ships.

At 2000, 7 August, orders were changed. The Lunga River was to be the Regimental objective rather than Grassy Knoll. The First Battalion was to advance almost due west, seize the airfield, and establish positions along the eastern bank of the Lunga River. The Second and Third Battalions were to advance to the Lunga River and set up positions along the eastern bank south of the First Battalion position. From right to left, the Regimental defense along the Lunga would be by battalions, First, Second and Third.

The First Battalion crossed the Ilu River in the vicinity of the Papaya patch and pushed on across the Tenaru River approximately 500 yards from the mouth, skirted the airfield and established positions along the Lunga River by nightfall.

The Second and Third Battalions crossed the Ilu River 1500 yards upstream from where the First Battalion crossed, circled around the headwaters of the Tenaru and cut into the jungle approximately 2800 yards south of the airfield. In the thick jungle they were only able to move forward at the rate of 1/3 miles per hour. They bivouacked that night on the upper regions of the Ilu River at a point about 4500 yards south of the airfield. It was discovered that inland the Ilu River, which they had already crossed once, flows from a west south westerly direction, then bends toward the northeast, thus flowing twice across the direction of advance of the Second and Third Battalions. No enemy activity was observed.

The morning of 9 August, Lieutenant Colonels Pollock and McKelvey, commanding officers of the Second and Third Battalions,

ANNEX M (Cont)

HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT

CONTINUED

respectively, received orders from Colonel Cates to withdraw from the jungle and set up a beach defense from Lunga Point to the Tenaru River.

9 August was spent in bringing the Second and Third Battalions from the jungle to the beach. The Tenaru Sector was established with the Second Battalion occupying the East subsector and the Third Battalion the West subsector. In Regimental reserve was the Special Weapons Battalion under Major Lucky. The First Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Cresswell was held as Division Reserve.

The dangers and difficulties of advancing through unknown terrain would have been greatly alleviated if ample and adequate photographs and maps had been provided. Stereo pairs would have been particularly valuable in studying the terrain. Had these been available, the route of the march could have been plotted in detail following natural routes of approach such as rivers, ridge lines and gullies instead of dense and at times impassable jungle.

Lugging heavy machine guns on the attack through the jungle, up river banks and ridges proved to be more of a burden than was worth while. Had the men been free of heavy machine guns and had carried light machine guns and automatic weapons such as Tommy Guns, the advance would have been more rapid, less exhausting and probably more efficient in combat had the enemy been engaged.

It is recommended that a machete should be issued to every man and officer so that the thick underbrush of the jungle can be rapidly overcome.

ANNEX N

D-3 JOURNALFIRST MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

From: 0519 Aug 7, 42
 To : 2400 Aug 7, 42
 PLACE: P-10

Time		No	Incidents, messages, orders, etc.
In	Out		
		1	:CP opened.
0527		2	:From Plot to CP - As soon as we are stopped :in transport area you will be notified. :Admiral desires time for ZERO hour from Gen- :eral.
		3	:Arrived in Transport area 0651
0653		4	:From Plot to CP - Zero hour 0910
	0653	5	:From ComLanFor to Liaison Plane Guadalcanal :Zero hour 0910
0714		6	:From Plot to CP - If you will send officer :to NavBridge we will indicate beach Red. :Acknowledge.
0721		7	:From Plot to CP - Hypo hour announced for :0800 for the North Side.
0815		8	:From Plot to CP - Troops landing on Beach :Blue.
0821		9	:From Plot to CP - Halavo boats are being :fired upon.
0832		10	:From Plot to CP - Our planes attacking Bun- :gana light probably enemy guns there.
0838		11	:From Plot to CP - Boats are entering Port :Pervis Inlet.
0851		12	:From Plot to CP - Astoria reports liaison :plane with Capt Campbell is now over the :landing beach.
0859		13	:From Plot to CP - Air intercepts states no :personnel moving toward beach Red.
0915		14	:From Plot to CP - Trucks are moving on Lunga :Field. (to D-2)
	0916	15	:From CP to Air Director - Order for air at- :tack on trucks on Lunga Field
0920		16	:From Liaison Plane to CP - Landing on Beach :Red - no opposition. (verbal)
0924		17	:Confirmation of Msg #16.
0926		18	:From Plot to CP - Inform General air attack- :ing trucks and personnel Lunga Field
0931		19	:From Liaison Plane to CP - Dive bombers just :completed bombing of runways of airfield. :(verbal)

ANNEX N (Cont)

0936	:	:	20	:	Confirmation of Msg #19
0940	:	:	21	:	From Air to Air radio (intercept) do not repeat not bomb runways. (phone)
0943	:	:	22	:	From Air to LanFor - Enemy encampment at M1852 - Troops on south side of river - planes strafing. (phone)
0949	:	:	23	:	From Air (intercept) Troops in woods at M2943. Seize 0946. (phone)
	:	0950	:	24	From LanFor to Air - Request air attack on troops at M2943
0951	:	:	25	:	Confirmation of Msg #23
0954	:	:	26	:	From Asst Div Comdr to 1st MarDiv East & West Florida Is. landing and landing Blue Beach successful - no resistance.
0952	:	:	27	:	Correction to Msg #25
0958	:	:	28	:	From Plot to CP - Planes are bombing enemy troops in woods at M2943
	:	1009	:	29	From ComLanFor to Liaison Plane - Report location own front lines. Also own movements and movements of hostile forces.
	:	1007	:	30	From ComLanFor - CTF 62 (Air Radio) Several bombers available - Can you use them. For relay to Asst Comdr.
	:		:	31	Msg #30 could not be relayed sent over division net.
1012	:	:	32	:	From Asst Div Comdr to 1st MarDiv - West Florida Island Group reports main objective taken 0820 - slight resistance.
1035	:	:	33	:	From Asst Div Comdr to 1st MarDiv - Do not need bombers.
	:	1037	:	34	From ComLanFor to Asst Div Comdr - Submit report on situation as it exists at 1200 today.
1039	:	:	35	:	From Plot to CP - Ammunition marked 3542 set on fire dive bombers 1000 lb bombs. Admiral Turner wants to know if we are in contact with Gen Rupertus.
1045	:	:	36	:	From Liaison Plane to CG - Amphib Trac penetrated 500 yds. in fr beach Amphib Trac have proceeded west along beach as far as Ilu River. No hostile forces in this area.
1048	:	:	37	:	From Plot to CP - Aircraft reports large concentration of troops and bldgs West of Lunga River.
1049	:	:	38	:	From Plot to CP - Have you rec'd any direct word from troops on beach. (Ans from Adv Msg Cen passed on to Bridge). "5th Marines landed without opposition or casualties - no report fr Bns but believed pushing ahead as planned. 2d Bn landing & moving out.

ANNEX N (Cont)

: 1105	: 39	: From ComLanFor to Air - Request consideration be given to Taivu in use of unexpended bombs.
1106	: 40	: From Flot to CP - Group Commander in air says he has not seen any artillery west of Lunga River.
1107	: 41	: From Liaison Plane to CG - Troops have penetrated eastward to where M7143. There is no change on other movements.
: 1111	: 42	: From ComLanFor to Liaison Plane - Report any enemy movements between Tetere and Beach Red. (verbal).
1111	: 43	: Confirmation of Msg #42.
1116	: 44	: From Plot to CP - Australia reports 1 Tractor C21 broken down. O.D. will send boat for it.
1126	: 45	: From Liaison Plane to CG - Squad has penetrated to M7642.
1131	: 46	: From Liaison Plane to CG - There are no enemy troops to be seen in this area.
1132	: 47	: From CTG62.2 to ComLanFor - Your 061615. Comtaskunit 62.8 will execute.
1133	: 48	: From Liaison Plane to CG - Stream at M6842 troops are crossing.
1134	: 49	: From Adv Msg Cen to CG - No tanks landed at this time. Please order K20 to start tanks to beach. Buse
1142	: 50	: From Plot to CP - Report to Col Thomas to tell BELLATRIX to expedite landing tanks on beach.
1142	: 51	: From Adv Msg Cen to CG - Roy on BHL Cliffs boys passing through bridges in operation.
: 1146	: 52	: From ComLanFor to Liaison Plane - Search carefully area west of Lunga River for hostile troops.
1146	: 53	: From Astoria to CTF 62 - Spotter reports no troop concentration except small number of men sighted in sector M3848 about 0725.
1156	: 54	: From Liaison Plane to CG - 200 trps in column seems to be a continuous stream of men to that area.
: 1154	: 55	: From ComLanFor to Liaison Plane - Your msg 1146 whose men question what area question - report coordinates.
1158	: 56	: From Plot to CP - Have you any info on progress at TULAGI.
1200	: 57	: From Plot to CP - White parachute flare seen at Beach Red.
: 1200	: 58	: From ComLanFor to CTF 62 - Information as to Tulagi situation as exists at 1200 has been requested. Will inform you on receipt of same.

ANNEX N (Cont)

1201	:	:	59	:	From Plot to CP - "From Neville to San Juan -
:	:	:	:	:	Two green rockets at 1130 concentrate fire
:	:	:	:	:	on hill 281.
1210	:	:	60	:	From Air to CP - Troops have landed on Gav-
:	:	:	:	:	utu. (verbal).
1214	:	:	61	:	Confirmation of Msg #60.
:	:	1236	62	:	From ComLanFor to Asst Div Comdr - Submit
:	:	:	:	:	report on situation in Tulagi area. Refer-
:	:	:	:	:	ence my msg 1037.
:	:	1240	63	:	From ComLanFor to CTF 62 - Request for bomb-
:	:	:	:	:	ing attack.
:	:	1244	64	:	From CG to CTF 62 - Report of Capt Campbell,
:	:	:	:	:	received from Liaison Plane, relay to
:	:	:	:	:	CTF 62.
1307	:	:	65	:	From Liaison Plane to ComLanFor - Request
:	:	:	:	:	for relief.
:	:	1312	66	:	From ComLanFor to Liaison Plane - Affirmat-
:	:	:	:	:	ive to Msg 65.
:	:	1312	67	:	From ComLanFor to Adv Msg Cen - Report sit-
:	:	:	:	:	uation on Guadalcanal.
1315	:	:	68	:	From Adv Msg Cen to 1st MarDiv - Report on
:	:	:	:	:	Colonels Cates & Maxwells units respectively.
1329	:	:	69	:	From Plot to CP - Enemy planes attacked us -
:	:	:	:	:	flew over high altitude - 2 downed - will
:	:	:	:	:	probably return over.
:	:	1321	70	:	From ComLanFor to Hunter Liggett - Expedite
:	:	:	:	:	unloading. (verbal to MsgCen).
:	:	1354	71	:	From ComLanFor to Adv Msg Cen - Has support
:	:	:	:	:	group landed.
1355	:	:	72	:	From Plot to CP - Aircraft reports no enemy
:	:	:	:	:	seen west Lunga River.
1404	:	:	73	:	From Air Radio to CP - Group area Comdr
:	:	:	:	:	Tulagi says no opposition troops in Tulagi
:	:	:	:	:	area. Can see own troops over island. Tanks
:	:	:	:	:	and Amphibs landed. Troops landed at Gavutu -
:	:	:	:	:	Boats returning empty. (by phone)
1406	:	:	74	:	From Plot to CP - Troops on Tulagi being cov-
:	:	:	:	:	ered by our planes. Are meeting no great or
:	:	:	:	:	visible opposition.
1410	:	:	75	:	From Guadalcanal Group Commander to CP - No
:	:	:	:	:	activity around airfields. (Air Radio) Troops
:	:	:	:	:	getting along OK on beach. River holding
:	:	:	:	:	them back 1/2 mile inland. (by phone)
1425	:	:	76	:	From Adv Msg Cen - to CG - Roy and Cliff
:	:	:	:	:	advancing - heavy going through thick ter-
:	:	:	:	:	rain - no report of contact - Support Group
:	:	:	:	:	landing.
1411	:	:	77	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - situation re-
:	:	:	:	:	port as of 1200.

ANNEX N (Cont)

1431	:	:	78	:	From CO 1st Marines to CG - Team 5 & 6
	:	:		:	landed 1100 - My CP establish initially
	:	:		:	M684312 - 2 leading combat teams now pas-
	:	:		:	sing through right front Combat Group A -
	:	:		:	No contact made as yet but terrain most dif-
	:	:		:	ficult.
	:	:	79	:	From ComLanFor to Asst Div Comdr - Report
	:	:		:	situation Tulagi Gavutu area Send in clear.
1446	:	:	80	:	From Adv Msg Cen to CG - not prepared take
	:	:		:	over operations reliable communication not
	:	:		:	yet established with units /k.
1448	:	:	81	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Tulagi Cgr Comdr
	:	:		:	reports that five bombers dropped 1,000 lbs
	:	:		:	bombs each on Tanambogo and then strafed it.
1449	:	:	82	:	From Adv Msg Cen to CG - Shore party command-
	:	:		:	er badly in need at least 500 men working
	:	:		:	party to unload boats X No troops available
	:	:		:	on beach /k.
1455	:	:	83	:	From 1st Marines to CG - Prep Mike Baker
	:	:		:	M6843 X Request instruction M684312.
1510	:	:	84	:	From 3rd Defense Bn to CG - CTF 62 Zero six
	:	:		:	zero five zero one unable to transfer Tare
	:	:		:	Baker William due to order of loading X a-
	:	:		:	vailable after transfer of ammunition at
	:	:		:	Guadalcanal.
1510	:	:	85	:	From Combat Group A to CG - Unit report.
	:	1515	86	:	From CG to CTF 62 - Division command post lo-
	:			:	cated at M6032.
1520	:	:	87	:	CP closed at P-10 opened at M6032
1534	:	:	88	:	From CTG 621 to CG - Beachmaster radio on
	:	:		:	2474 KCS X Can guard for you if desired.
1534	:	:	89	:	From CTG 621 to CG - Each affirm prep fift-
	:	:		:	teen men to unload boats at beach until re-
	:	:		:	lieved by pioneers.
	:	1536	90	:	From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Upon reembark-
	:			:	ation hold First Raider Bn to assist leav-
	:			:	ing up Tulagi Area X Report when they may
	:			:	be released to Division.
	:	1601	91	:	From CG to 1st MarDiv - Have landed on beach.
	:	1611	92	:	From CG to 1st MarDiv - Can you find out
	:			:	where forward echelon is set up on beach.
1615	:	:	93	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Tulagi Group
	:	:		:	landed without opposition have advanced be-
	:	:		:	yond line but encountering strong enemy for-
	:	:		:	ces in vicinity Hill 231 X Gavutu Group land-
	:	:		:	ed 1200 encountered resistance X Captured.
1618	:	:	94	:	From Support Group to CG - Unit report.
1635	:	:	95	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Cates reports
	:	:		:	leading battalion has advanced so rapidly
	:	:		:	he has lost contact with it X Request as-
	:	:		:	sistance of Liaison Plane.

ANNEX N (Cont)

D-3 JOURNAL

FIRST MARINE DIVISION FLEET MARINE FORCE

From: 0519 Aug 7, 42
To : 2400 Aug 7, 42
PLACE: M6032

: 1642	: 96	: From CG to Liaison Plane (Unit Easy) Con-
:	:	: tact leading battalion of First Marines ad-
:	:	: vancing toward Hill south of Lunga Point
:	:	: and report location.
1645	: 97	: From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Major Weir Tulagi
:	:	: has been completely captured.
1649	: 98	: From Adv Msg Cn to CG - CP ashore ready for
:	:	: operation X From Hall /k.
1815	: 99	: From Rear Echelon (afloat) to CG - before
:	:	: leaving Air Support Group command X Report-
:	:	: ed a secondary encampment west side of Lunga
:	:	: airfield.
1829	: 100	: From Rear Echelon (afloat) to PZUJD In view
:	:	: of prospect of bombing tomorrow most desirable
:	:	: send out Arthur less Pres Jackson tonight
:	:	: unless you consider retention essential X
:	:	: Appreciate prompt advice from CTF 62.
: 2001	: 101	: From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Have all ob-
:	:	: jectives in Tulagi area been seized.
2125	: 102	: From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Japs still in
:	:	: hospital area Tulagi will continue attack
:	:	: tomorrow.
2240	: 103	: From 1st Bn 5th Marines to CG - B and C comp-
:	:	: anies 1-5 in position east bank Tenaru River
:	:	: X Patrolling beach west bank of River and in-
:	:	: land X A and D companies in support positions
:	:	: for possible enemy counterattacks X CP locat-
:	:	: ed in draw 500 yds west of Tenaru plantation
:	:	: X Have no communication whatsoever X 81mm
:	:	: Mortars cannot be located request assistance
:	:	: in sending same to position X Expect to move
:	:	: out to the west in attack at dawn or shortly
:	:	: thereafter X Imperative that we have 3 to 5
:	:	: additional amphib tractors by daybreak to as-
:	:	: sist in crossing rivers with heavy weapons
:	:	: and equipment X Please forward all this in-
:	:	: formation to Reg Hq 5th Marines X Lt Arm-
:	:	: itage by order Col Maxwell /SO.
2330	: 104	: From Shore Party to CG - Unloading entirely
:	:	: out of hand X Supplies arriving much faster
:	:	: than we can handle X Imperative we stop ships
:	:	: unloading until we can clear beach 1000 to-
:	:	: morrow X Rowen and Patson concur X.

ANNEX N (Cont)

0242	:	:	105	:	From ComLanFor to CG - Discontinue unloading at beach X will comply your request.
	:	:	0650	:	106 : From CG to CTF 62 - Troops advancing to Lunga River X Division command post displacing to vicinity of airfield X No contacts during night.
	:	:	0749	:	107 : From CG to Liaison Plane - Report location front line elements X Report positions immediately.
	:	:	1024	:	108 : From CG to CTF 62 - First and Fifth Marines moving toward Lunga River from Tenaru River X Division Hqtrs moving behind troops to vicinity of airfield.
1045	:	:		:	109 : Impending Air attacks X Enemy bombers X Be on alert.
1202	:	:		:	110 : From 5th Marines to CG - Vincennes liaison officer received report from ship that numerous enemy planes left Rabaul early this morning heading in this direction.
1210	:	:		:	111 : From Combat Group A to CG - Combat Group A CP set up at M630380.
	:	:	1300	:	112 : From CG to All Units - Turn over to Major Buse two Half tracks and two amphibious tractors all with crews.
1400	:	:		:	113 : From 1st Marines to CG - Repeating no opposition X Tough going terrain X CT #5 and CT #6 moved out as scheduled CT #5 and 1/5 now advancing X I have shifted CT #4 to a bearing to right of objective about 255 bearing X Will tanks support 1/5 and my CT #4 Have not had a report from CT #5 but they are well on their way X Have ordered CTs 4 and 6 to push forward fast X Contact me at this CP X Laying line to your CP.
	:	:	1515	:	114 : From CG to Adv Msg Cen - Report your position by coordinates immediately.
1527	:	:		:	115 : From 1st Marines to CG - CP disclosed forward to M64284.
1600	:	:		:	116 : From 5th Marines to CG - Present front line and direction of advance shown in overlay X 1st Bn advancing toward Ilu River.
1731	:	:		:	117 : From 1st MarDiv CP to CG - Advance very slow due terrain engrs vitally needed recommend land additional battalion at once /k.
	:	:	1750	:	118 : From CG to CTF 62 - Urgent require photographic mosaic area Segilau - Kaukau ten miles inland.
	:	:	1836	:	119 : From CG to Asst Div Comdr - well done to troops in Tulagi area.
	:	:	1845	:	120 : From CG to CO AmphForce - No additional information regarding enemy there is no indication that the Second Marines less Jackson contingent will be needed.

ANNEX N (Cont)

D-3 JOURNAL

FIRST MARINE DIVISION FLEET MARINE FORCE

From: 2400 Aug 7, 42
To : 2400 Aug 8, 42
PLACE: M6732

Time		No	Incidents, messages, orders, etc.
In	Out		
0738		1	:From 11th Mar to CG --All boats report back to ship
0810		2	:From CTF 62 to CG - Have you an immediate target for bombers
	0815	3	:From CG to CTF 62 - Answer to message No 2 - No
0819		4	:From Support Group to CG - Record of Events
	0900	5	:CP closed at M6732 opened at M4840
1210		6	:From CTF 62 to CG - Do you have control Lunga Report
	1210	7	:From CG to CTF 62 - Answer to message No 6 - Our troops have passed alligator Creek moving toward Lunga River
1221		8	:From Plane to CG - 19 unknown planes approaching (intercept)
1221		9	:From Plane to CG - Aircraft about to bomb southern end of Tulagi (intercept)
1222		10	:From Plane to CG - Keep lookout for subs believed in vicinity (intercept)
1250		11	:From Plane to CG - Sub bearing 332 (intercept)
1305		12	:From Plane to CG - Will drop 5 bombs SBDs west side of Cammamgoga go ahead (intercept)
1320		13	:From Amph Trac to CG - What is your location
	1332	14	:From CG to Amph Trac Bn - Division Command Post located at M4840
	1400	15	:From CG to CTF 62 - Situation report as of message 1340
1355		16	:From to CG Expect air attack in half hour X use own judgement X If it comes it will be at 080
1510		17	:From 3-5 to CG - Report Jap patrol activity rear of N Btry position X Light exchange of fire about 1100 X No information
	1625	18	:From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Expedite reply my 1432
1530		19	:From CO Group 3 to CG - Situation of Combat Team #5 as of 1530
1630		20	:From To CG For Easy Medical Co X Have you sent stretcher bearers to CT 4 aid station X There casualties to be evacuated X Please answer

ANNEX N (Cont)

D-3 JOURNAL

FIRST MARINE DIVISION FLEET MARINE FORCE

From: 2400 Aug 7, 42
To : 2400 Aug 8, 42
PLACE: M4840

: 1650	:	21	: From CG to Combat Group B - Your 1553 twelve
:	:	:	: litter bearers one medical officer are en-
:	:	:	: route your aid station
1710	:	22	: From Asst Div Comdr to CG - For what it is
:	:	:	: worth suggest that enemy force reported vic-
:	:	:	: inity M1454 may have joined force reported
:	:	:	: vicinity M3350
2014	:	23	: From CTF 62 to CG - Will continue to un-
:	:	:	: load tonight
2014	:	24	: From CTF 62 to CG - Have no word of North
:	:	:	: situation X Trying to find out
2200	:	25	: From Support Group to CG - Journal
2200	:	26	: From 11th Marines to CG - Unit report

ANNEX N (30107)

D-3 JOURNALFIRST MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

From: 2400 Aug 8, 42
 To : 2400 Aug 9, 42
 PLACE: M4840

0007	:	:	1	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Casualties in
	:	:		:	Raider Bn 22% Parachute Bn 50 or 60% X Re-
	:	:		:	quests additional combat teams in trans-
	:	:		:	port area Beach Blue by daylight
0828	:	:	2	:	From Pion Bn to CG - Request information
	:	:		:	about request for 500 men working party
	:	0844	3	:	From CG to Pion Bn - 5th Bn 11th Mar order-
	:	:		:	ed to relieve 3rd Bn 11th on beach will ar-
	:	:		:	rive about 1000
1300	:	:	4	:	From Co C Pion Bn to CG - Kindly give me
	:	:		:	your coordinates also information regard-
	:	:		:	ing lesser units, DPs, coordinates, lines,
	:	:		:	enemy situations
	:	1312	5	:	From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Send report
	:	:		:	Makambo situation
1440	:	:	6	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Awaiting an-
	:	:		:	swer to your 1312
1440	:	:	7	:	From 5th Mar to CG - Baker company killed 3
	:	:		:	Jap army personnel X One Marine shot in
	:	:		:	stomach X Action occurred west of Kukum X
	:	:		:	Arms captured
1455	:	:	8	:	From Combat Group A to CG - Record of Events
1627	:	:	9	:	From 5th Mar to CG - CP located at M175950
	:	1645	10	:	From CG to 1st Eng Bn - For Major Frazier X
	:	:		:	Report to Division CP immediately
1714	:	:	11	:	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Landing effect-
	:	:		:	ed on Mbangi at 1300 and on Makambo at 1530
	:	:		:	X Both landings successful now in clearing
	:	:		:	up process X Individual snipers still act-
	:	:		:	ive in Tulagi
1715	:	:	12	:	From 1st Marines to CG - Situation report
	:	:		:	as of message 1715
2055	:	:	13	:	From 11th Mar to CG - G Btry reports contact
	:	:		:	with enemy patrol in rear of their position
	:	:		:	at about 2050 at M4630
2205	:	:	14	:	From 5th Mar to CG (Telephone) (Intercepted)
	:	:		:	Report contact with enemy patrol in rear of
	:	:		:	rear position at about 2010 at M4630

ANNEX N (Cont)

2245	:	:	15	:	From 11th Mar to CG - Received from 3 dash
	:	:		:	11th the following message X Enemy machine
	:	:		:	gun at right of Inter Battery X Battery has
	:	:		:	situation under control X Unquote
2345	:	:	16	:	From 11th Mar to CG - Received following
	:	:		:	message X at 2120 spasm X Odic Contact with
	:	:		:	enemy behind position X One Marine X Hypo
	:	:		:	X Battery dead X Our patrol scouting area X
	:	:		:	Believing we can handle situation X Unquote

ANNEX O

082/271

Headquarters, First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
C/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

18 February 1943.

MEMORANDUM: D-3.

Subject: Guadalcanal Operation - final report on Signal Communication (Phase II).

Reference: (b) CG 1stMarDiv Conf ltr 082/271 over AE-034 to ComAmphForSoPacFor, 5 Aug 42 (Copy attached).
(c) CG 1stMarDiv Conf ltr 082/271 over AE-040 to ComAmphForSoPacFor, 10 Sep 42 (Copy attached).
(d) CG 1stMarDiv Conf ltr 082/271 to CMC, 15 Aug 42 (Copy attached).

1. Signal Communication.

(a) Phase I.

Previously submitted.

(b) Phase II. Communications during this phase were unreliable due to numerous contributory causes, in order of relative importance, as follows:

a. Adequate personnel and reliable equipment not provided for establishment and operation of base radio and wire communications.

b. Essential equipment and space requirements aboard ship not provided. See reference (a).

c. Many radio personnel were inadequately trained and inexperienced. From the time of leaving the United States to the date of actual landing, practically no training in radio operation could be conducted. Many radio personnel had just been received in the division.

d. Insufficient personnel in Division Signal Company, embarkation of that company on four ships, availability of only about one third of its transportation, and lack of certain authorized signal equipment in many units.

e. Duplication in frequencies assigned to Naval units and to Landing Force units could have been serious had enemy interference made shifting to secondary frequencies necessary.

ANNEX O (Cont)

Subject: Guadalcanal Operation - final report on Signal Communication (Phase II).

f. Radio equipped vehicles were needed to provide continuous communication during movement of units but were not available.

g. Slowdown of traffic due to difficulty of encryption and decryption under adverse conditions, shortage of personnel, and limited available cryptographic aids.

h. Frequent interruptions to field wire lines by amphibian tractors.

i. Command posts of units were on the move so frequently that pack radio sets could be installed and operated for only brief intervals.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Provide well trained and adequately equipped communication teams to accompany landing force for the purpose of establishing advanced base radio and wire communication as recommended in reference (c).

2. Provide essential communication equipment and space requirements aboard ship upon which Division Headquarters is embarked. See reference (a).

3. The basic course in radio schools should be lengthened to give more field training including operation at night, and under adverse climatic conditions. Time for coordinated training of all communication activities prior to actual operations is necessary if efficient signal communication is to be obtained.

4. New personnel and equipment allowances are believed to be adequate for operational purposes provided the personnel and equipment are actually furnished. The Division Signal Company should be embarked on the approximate basis of two-thirds of personnel and equipment on ship on which Division Headquarters is embarked and the remainder on one other ship only.

5. Definite frequency assignments must be made for the use of landing force units well in advance of an operation to insure that radio interference between our own forces will not occur in communication plans. See reference (b).

6. Radio equipped vehicles and additional equipment as recommended in reference (d) are now authorized.

ANNEX O (Cont)

SECRET

Subject: Guadalcanal Operation - final report on Signal Com-
munication (Phase II).

7. Provide thoroughly trained coding officers, extra allowances of strip ciphers, and adequate facilities for working during blackouts with advanced base radio communication teams recommended in reference (c).

8. Field wire lines in areas used by amphibian tractors must be placed overhead or laid in trenches to prevent interruptions to service. The increase in lineman's belts and climbers now authorized will facilitate wire lines being placed overhead more rapidly when conditions permit.

9. Provision is now made in allowance tables for vehicular radio sets as recommended in reference (d).

G. P. SATTLER
for
E. W. SNEDEKER

ANNEX O (Cont)

082/271

Headquarters, First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
C/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

18 February 1943.

From: The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF.
To : The Commander Amphibious Force, South Pacific.
Subject: Radio - frequency assignments for 1st Mar Div use.
Referency: (a) PAC-70.
(b) USF-84.

1. Reference (a) makes provision for five administrative radio frequencies for Marine use, and refers to reference (b) for other frequency assignments. Reference (b), however, is no longer effective. So far as is known landing force units are therefore left without any definite assignments of radio frequencies for tactical use.

2. It is imperative that a definite assignment of frequencies available for landing force use be made, in order that a landing force communication plan can be formulated that will not conflict with other radio frequency assignments.

3. (a) The normal radio frequency requirements of this division, based on frequency coverages of equipment now supplied and on tactical radio communication requirements, are as follows:

DIVISION HIGH FREQ-	:1900:	2000	: 3000	: 3500	: 4525
QUENCY REQUIREMENTS:	to :	to	: to	: to	: to
	:2000:	3000	: 3500	: 4525	: 9050
DIV COMD NET	:	:	: 1(S)	: 1(P)	:
DIV AIR-TANK NET	:	:	: 1(P)	: 1(S)	:
DIV WARNING NET	:	:	: 1(P)	: 1(S)	:
DIV AIR SUPPORT NET	:	:	: 1(S)	: 1(P)	:6(P)(S)
Inf Regts (3); Atchd Inf (1)	:	: 4(P)	: 2(S)	: 2(S)	:
Arty Regt	:	: 1(P)	:	: 1(S)	:
Arty Spot	:	:	: 1(P)	: 1(S)	:
Landing Grp Nets, 4 beaches	:	:	:	:8(P)(S)	:
1st Amph Trac Bn	:	:	: 1(S)	: 1(P)	:6(P)(S)
1st Para Bn (2980)	:	: 1(P)	:	:	:
1st Pion Bn	:	: 3(P)	:	: 3(S)	:
1st Scout Co	:	:	: 1(S)	: 1(P)	:6(P)(S)
1st Spl Weap Bn	:	:8(P)(S)	:	:	:
1st Tk Bn	:	:	: 1(S)	: 1(P)	:8(P)(S)
Air Ln - Dir Support Air	:	:	:	:2(P)(S)	: 2

ENCLOSURE "B"

ANNEX O (4)

ANNEX O (Cont)

Subject: Radio - frequency assignments for 1st Mar Div use.

Arty Spot Planes	:	:	:	2(P)(S)	:	12(P)(S)
For unit assignments	:	:	:	:	:	:
Div Hq	:	3	:	3	:	2 : 2 : 6
Inf Regts, 1 per ea Bn	:	:	:	9	:	:
Arty Regt, 1 per ea Bn	:	:	:	5	:	:
Raider Bn	:	:	:	2(P)	:	2(S) :
TOTAL CHANNELS	:	3	:	36	:	16 : 26 : 36

(P) Primary frequency.
(S) Secondary frequency.

(b) The following exact frequency assignments, included in the above totals, should be made:

2980 kcs - fixed frequency of parachute battalion radio equipments.

3155 kcs) all portable radio equipments (TBX)
& : - supplied the Division have crystals
4105 kcs) for these two frequencies.

(c) Future changes in organization or in types of radio equipment will necessitate revision of the requirements herein listed from time to time.

4. It is requested that action be taken to obtain a definite assignment of radio frequencies for the use of this Division at the earliest opportunity.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT

ANNEX O (Cont)

082/271
(AE-040)

Headquarters, First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

10 September 1942.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commander Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force.
Subject: Advanced base radio and wire communications.

1. The establishment of advanced base radio communication with other bases and task forces, and of essential base wire communication facilities to serve the many activities of an advanced base is a task of considerable magnitude. It is one which requires adequate equipment and personnel.

2. A Marine Division is provided with communication personnel and allowances of equipment for the specific purpose of providing tactical communications for the division, and with a higher headquarters and aircraft in the immediate vicinity, during the landing and seizure of a beachhead. It does not have personnel or equipment for the installation or operation of advanced base radio and wire communications coincident with the installation and operation of tactical communications. Its radio equipment is not suitable for continuous or reliable long distance communication.

3. It has been possible to obtain fairly reliable radio communication with distant stations during the present operations only by placing in operation captured enemy equipment. Captured wire equipment has also been used to provide extensive wire communication. It can not be anticipated that these fortunate circumstances will exist in future operations. Operating personnel have been provided only with difficulty and loss of tactical communication efficiency.

4. Personnel and equipment for the installation, operation and maintenance of advanced base radio and wire communications are available in CUB units. CUB ONE has recently provided certain personnel and equipment for base radio operation and expects additional personnel and equipment in the near future.

5. It is recommended that in future landing operations all personnel and equipment required for the establishment, operation and maintenance of advanced base radio and wire communication facilities accompany the landing force and be landed as soon as the tactical situation ashore permits the initiation of

ENCLOSURE "C"

ANNEX O (6)

ANNEX O (Cont)

Subject: Advanced base radio and wire communications.

base radio and wire communication facilities. It is believed that personnel and materiel for the purpose may be obtained from CUB units.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT

Copy to: Comdt., Marine Corps
 ComSoPac.

ANNEX C (Cont)

082/271

Headquarters, First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

15 August 1942.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Signal Equipment and Personnel.

Reference: CG 1st Mar Div ltr 2385, 082/271 to Comdt. of
7 Apr 42.

1. The landing operations in which this division recently participated involved practically constant movement on the part of units. Installation of wire lines and of radio equipment with sufficient rapidity to provide communication with command posts almost constantly on the move was impossible in most cases. Such wire as was laid on the ground was soon broken by vehicles, particularly by amphibian tractors. Under the conditions encountered radio was the only practicable method of communication, but could not be continuous due to rapidity of movement.

2. To provide continuous communication during operations of this type it is imperative that mobile radio equipment installed in $\frac{1}{4}$ ton or similar trucks be supplied all tactical units and it is urgently recommended that such radio equipped trucks be supplied at the earliest practicable moment. The type of radio equipment contemplated in this paragraph should be not less than 15 watts, voice and CW, cover as a minimum the frequency ranges of the TBX, and be powered from the truck battery. Several crystal channels are desirable if practicable. Vehicles intended for this purpose should be completely radio equipped, when supplied. It is not satisfactory for the vehicle and radio equipment to be supplied separately. $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks are especially recommended as they are easily landed and can move over nearly any type of terrain. Blackout curtains for night operation must be provided. Allowances of $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks, radio equipped, as herein described, are recommended as follows:

Hq Infantry Battalion	2
Hq Infantry Regiment	3
Hq Artillery Battalion	8
Hq Artillery Regiment	5
Hq Tank Co	1
Hq Tank Bn	2
Hq Pioneer Bn	2

ENCLOSURE "D"

(8)

ANNEX O (Cont)

Subject: Signal Equipment and Personnel.

Hq Amphibian Tractor Bn	2
Hq Special Weapons Bn	2
Hq Engineer Bn	2 (with allowance of radio operators)
Hq Service Bn	2 (with allowance of radio operators)
Division Signal Company	5

3. It is requested that every effort be made to complete the TBA allowances of items of signal equipment for all units of this division which to date have not been available or were not received by this division prior to departure from the States.

4. Losses of signal equipment and supplies due to shipment, landing and combat are such that the replenishment allowances prescribed in TBA are inadequate. A 100 per cent increase in all replenishment allowances, with a minimum of not less than one of any item, is recommended at this time. Further experience may show that additional increases are necessary.

5. The following additional recommendations that should be made effective without delay are made:

- (a) That reference (a) be approved and additional personnel furnished without delay, the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton radio equipped trucks recommended herein to be included in the total recommended in the reference.
- (b) That 2 portable power units, 110 volt, 60 cycle, 10 KVA be allowed a Division Signal Company.
- (c) That suitable cryptographic devices or codes be provided all Marine units without delay. Paper strip ciphers are entirely unsatisfactory for this purpose. CSP 1249(A) is fairly satisfactory for code dispatches, but there are no ROB editions. It has no value for air-ground panel communication.
- (d) That the proper radio receivers for the Model TBW radio equipment be made available as soon as possible.
- (e) That the initial allowances of the following items be changed as indicated:

ANNEX C (Cont)

Subject: Signal Equipment and personnel.

Axle RL-27	Increase allowances 50%
Belt LC-23 & Climbers	Increase allowances 500%
Charging set SCR-169	Increase Sig Co to 2
Frequency meter set SCR 211	Increase Sig Co to 4
Head and chest set HS-19	Add 6 per Sig Co
Ohmmeter type 22196	Increase Sig Co to 6
Projector, signal, ground	Increase allowances 100% and add 2 per Para Bn
Radio receiving equipment Model S29	Increase Sig Co to 4; add 1 per Inf & Arty Regts
Radio equipment Model TBW	Increase Sig Co to 3
Reel unit RL-31	Increase allowances 1000%. Add 3 per Pion Bn
Tags MC-72	Increase allowances 1000%
Telephones EE-8	Increase allowances 25%
Wire W-107	Increase allowances 1000%

6. In all cases where radio equipment is provided for installation in vehicles it is essential that the equipment be installed prior to the vehicles being furnished combat units. At present certain radio equipment provided for truck installations has had to be installed in non-shielded trucks having only a 6 volt power supply, whereas a 12 volt power supply is required for the radio equipment.

7. Operation of communication agencies at night during blackout and inclement weather requires that blackout tents, the size varying according to the equipment and personnel to be enclosed, be provided for message center, telephone switchboard and radio stations.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT
